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Abstract
Broadly, the focus of this thesis is to consider how oppression affects the self.
More specifically, this project supports the claim that there is a conflicting imposition (by
being oppressed) placed on queer folk in black (American) Christian spaces that affects
the self. The position is elucidated through a four-chapter structure. In the first chapter, I
provide a charitable reading to Mead’s theory of the self. I end the chapter by considering
how a dissonance may occur. In chapter two, I define identity through a hermeneutical
lens and supplement this theory by considering the ways identity can be imposed and
taken. I end the chapter by defining oppression and situating oppression with the theory
of intelligible identities. In the next chapter, I show the importance of recognizing
intersectionality through considering the Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity. In
exploring the model, the concept of a core sense of self is assumed. I then consider this
assumption, clarify it, and situate this concept within Mead’s theory of the self. The
fourth, and final, chapter considers a specific environment in which there is a dialectical
dissonance and an identity dissonance because of oppression. The focus, here, is
queerness in black, American Christian spaces. I show the relationship between
dialectical dissonance and identity dissonance, and end the chapter, and the thesis, by
putting forth ways to rectify the experience of identity dissonance for black queer folk.
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Introduction
The title, “Inviting Others In: How Oppression Affects the Self,” is largely influenced
by Darnell Moore, author of No Ashes in the Fire: Coming of Age Black and Free in
America. In conversation with Moore, he and I, among others, were discussing how to
navigate one’s professional career while being queer.1 I posed this discussion topic as I was
hesitant about being openly queer and transgender while being a professional inside and
outside of academia. He began to talk about his own experience and how he did not feel like
“coming out,” in terms of sexuality, was what he was meant to do, especially because not
everyone has to come out. Largely, though, for queer folks, it is often an expectation to come
out as being queer is deemed to be outside the norm. He reframed this expectation, though,
by stating that he would rather invite others in, into his home, where his home was a
metaphor for his life, his existence, to the way that he understood his “self.” By inviting
others in rather than coming out, he was the one who got to decide who was welcome to
know who he is. He gets to frame his own narrative, he gets to be the author of his own
narrative. This struck a chord with me. I knew I needed to write, in some way, about my
experiences has a queer person of color, but did not know how to frame my inspiration for
doing so – until this conversation.
This Independent Study serves as a way to invite others into my experience as a queer
personal of color. Given the time and scope of a project such as this Independent Study, I
could not possibly cover everything I may have wanted to. In order to narrow my scope,

1Queerness is in reference to what it is to exist outside of the norms of gender, gender roles, gender expression,
and sexuality. To be transgender is for one’s gender identity to be outside of the norm, that is, cisgender.
Cisgender describes those whose gender falls in line with their sex assigned at birth.
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though, I considered what it meant (for me) to be a philosopher, the discipline of philosophy,
and why I decided to spend four years questioning everything.
Being a philosopher, to me, in a way, is like being constantly hungry and never
satisfied. It is discovering the intrinsic value of learning. It is wrestling with questions that
really matter to you, even if they don’t seem like big questions, because most end up having
big roots. What originally attracted me to philosophy was a course I took in high school
titled, “Honors Western Humanities.” In that unique space, I finally had the chance to think
about those questions that always bugged me, those particular questions that church folk
would scold me for having. What really committed me to philosophy was not the readings
necessarily, rather it was the discussion around it.
If I reach back to my 14-year-old self in that classroom, I can remember the
conversations about the way the world is, God, and love. Taking this course made me realize
that there is so much more than what I was merely told. As I was learning about Plato’s
Allegory of the Cave, I literally felt like I was coming out of the cave, and now the new
ability to questions what I thought I knew was that blinding feeling of new enlightenment.
Philosophy was something that I needed in that moment in order finally be reflective. At that
time, it was almost as if I had accessed another part of my brain that was previously closed
off.
I needed philosophy because I was struggling and couldn’t possibly articulate it in the
way I can now. During this time, religion had been a big part of my life. I can remember
having to always go to church every Sunday, and sometimes bible study every Wednesday.
This was never something I wanted to do, it was something I had to do. After every Sunday
service, I always felt conflicted. It never felt right, and I could not put a finger on that feeling.
I would always ask why we had to go to church, and the response was always because we
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believe in God, and we are supposed to go. But I never felt like I was a part of the we. I
disagreed whole heartedly with the culture surrounding my black Baptist church, the
teachings of each sermon that were riddled with toxic paternalism and the incessant sexism
and homophobia. I hated being a part of that culture and religion. I lived in the sea of you
have to, with no why. I was an incredibly angry and angsty as a result. I realize now that a lot
of my feelings at the time had to do with the disconnect between my multitude of identities
and how they contradicted with the preached tenets of the religion and the surrounding black
cultural norms.
My experience here is something that I continually reflect on, and throughout writing
my Independent Study, the writing became a way for me to philosophically understand my
own experience that others have, too, undoubtedly experienced. Originally, the question was
about the “coming out” experience, that is, the public expression of one’s sexuality or gender
given that it is deemed outside of the norm. I was curious about how “coming out” affected
the “self.” I realized, though, the problem was not the “coming out” phenomenon, it was the
fact that having a particular gender identity or sexuality meant one had to come out. And
once out, you were to be oppressed. As someone who is black, transgender, and queer,
oppression and discrimination are, well, nothing new. The question, then, became: “how does
oppression affect the self?” This question, and thus response, became more specific through
questioning and refocusing. The position of this thesis, then, is that: there is a conflicting
imposition (by being oppressed) placed on queer folk in black (American) Christian spaces
that affects the self.
Given the philosophical claim of this thesis, the project is divided into four chapters.
The first chapter, “On the Nature of the Self,” provides a charitable reading of George
Herbert Mead’s theory of the self. In defining the self, I explicate the distinction between the
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“I” and “me.” As a result of this duality, the self is inherently dialectical. I then expand on a
scenario that Mead presents in order to show that there are certain instances in which a
dissonance occurs between the “I” and the “me.”
In the second chapter, “On the Nature of Identity and Oppression,” I define identity in
order to show the basis of which one is oppressed. By considering Georgia Warnke’s take on
identity, identity is understood through a hermeneutical lens to show identity’s dependency
on context and how certain identities are intelligible. I then expand on Warnke by
considering the ways in which intelligible identities can be and are imposed or taken through
Robert Gooding-Williams’ philosophy. Given this theory of identity, I consider what
oppression is through Marilyn Frye’s essays and draw the connections between identity,
oppression, and being a part of a social group.
The third chapter, “Intersectionality and the Core Sense of Self,” highlights the
significance of intersectionality by considering the Model of Multiple Dimensions of
Identity. This model, though, presents an interesting concept of the “core sense of self.” I
then explain what this core sense of self is, exactly, and how it relates to Mead’s theory of the
self.
In the fourth and final chapter, “The Oppression of Queerness in Black Religious
Spaces,” I consider a specific environment in which there is a dialectical dissonance and an
identity dissonance because of oppression. I do so to utilize a particular experience to better
understand the particular claim of this thesis. I first define identity dissonance and how this
may occur for those a part of an oppressive group and the oppressed group. I then specify the
context of the black church in the United States and how it relates to black culture. I consider
the conflicting impositions experienced by black queer folk. To end the chapter, I provide a
way to begin to rectify these resulting dissonances of oppression.
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Chapter One: On the Nature of the Self
The overarching goal of this project, very broadly, is to consider how oppression
affects the self. Specifically, I want to support the claim that there is a conflicting imposition
(from being oppressed) placed on queer folk in black Christian spaces that affects the self. In
order to understand how oppression affects the self, you first have to understand the
components that make up the question. Thus, oppression and self are key concepts that need
to be defined. Furthermore, the ways in which the self can be affected must be understood.
The very first step, then, must be an analysis of the self. As such, the purpose of this chapter
is to provide a charitable reading of the self, provide an argument from the nature of the self
to show that oppression can affect the self, and lastly to present a possible condition of the
nature, or the ontology, of the self while oppressed.
George Herbert Mead presents a theory of the self which falls in line with a
“dialectic” personal and interpersonal ideology of the self. This theory of the self is
incredibly socially situated. By this I mean that what the self is, is dependent on social
interaction. Mead put forth groundbreaking ideas through “his concepts of ‘generalized
other’ and his rather strikingly socialized ‘self.’”1 As a philosopher of evolution, Mead was
focused on “emergence evolution.”2 In thinking about how we come to be, he took in
consideration the effects of the society we live in and the communities we interact with,
which led to the cultivation of a theory of the self. Mead’s theory of the self is rooted in the
assertion that the self develops as an object to itself, the subject. Accordingly, the self is a
subject and an object. Mead further explores this idea through the distinction between the “I”
and the “me.”

1
2

George Herbert Mead. 1956. On Social Psychology., Ed. Anselm Straus. “Introduction” p. xi
Mead. Social Psychology. xvii
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Section I: George Herbert Mead on How the Self Develops
Mead describes the nature of the self through considering how it relates to the other
aspects of the individual by first considering the nature of an individual. He tries to “connect
[an] entire evolutionary process with social organization in its most complex expression, and
as that within which arise the very individuals through whose life-process it works, giving
birth to just such elements as are involved in the development of selves.”3
Before this point in the text, Mead presents a canonical example of evolutionary
process through showing how far man has come since the state of nature to civilization.4 The
purpose of this, though, is to show how “finally we see the situation as one in which we try to
do with self-consciousness what took place by a process of evolution.”5 Connecting the
evolutionary process to how we have developed requires the faculty of self-consciousness.
Thus, the element that Mead is alluding to here is self-consciousness that necessitates
control.6 As self-consciousness is the ability to recognize and reflect on the environment we
are in, we need the faculty of control because it helps us utilize this ability. Control comes
into play here because “the human being as a social form actually has relatively complete
control over his environment.”7 There is an interest in the experience of the individual and
the development of control because through this understanding, the “self” arises:
… the human self arises through its ability to take the attitude of the group to
which he belongs – because he can talk to himself in terms of the community
to which he belongs and lay upon himself the responsibilities that belong to the
community; because he can recognize his own duties as against others – that is
what constitutes the self as such. And there you see what we have emphasized,
as peculiar to others, that which is both individual and which is habitual. The

Mead. Social Psychology. 30
Mead. Social Psychology. 27
5 Mead. Social Psychology. 31
6 Mead. Social Psychology. 30
7 Mead. Social Psychology. 30
3
4
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structure of society lies in these social habits, and only insofar as we can take
these social habits into ourselves can we become selves.8
This paragraph provides further understanding to the idea of a socialized self which comes
from recognizing the evolution of the individual.
The first claim that comes from this excerpt makes clear that the self arises or
develops through social interactions. This is based off of the ability to think of oneself in
relation to the group that you are a part of, which allows you to see yourself in relation to
others around you. This is best understood as self-consciousness. Through our ability to
reflect on the attitudes and the environment we are in, an object and subject dialectic of the
self arises.9 He furthers this self dialectical through the connection with that which is both
individual and habitual. He does this in order to show the relationship between the individual
and the society they are in, which can be understood through social habits. Social evolution
drives Mead’s theory and shows how an understanding of the faculties of an individual can
lead to the development of the self.
In the section titled “Self,” Mead goes in to more depth about how one ought to
understand the self. He, again, reiterates that “the self is something which has a
development.”10 This development occurs through the process of social experience and
activity.11 What further supports his claim that the self arises through social experience is this
idea that the self “develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process
as a whole, and to other individuals within that process.”12 It is the case that “a self can arise
only where there is a social process within which this self has had its initiation.”13 This seems

Mead. Social Psychology. 33
This will be further explained in later paragraphs
10 Mead. Social Psychology. 199
11 Mead. Social Psychology. 199
12 Mead. Social Psychology. 199
13 Mead. Social Psychology. 42 [emphasis added]
8
9
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to follow the assertion that an individual will adopt the attitude of the community in which he
belongs, thus the “individual is a part of the process where he influences himself as he does
others.”14 Though Mead provides this understanding of an individual as influencing himself
and the community to which he belongs, he clearly differentiates between the body and the
self in order to show how the self is capable of influencing himself and others.
The understanding and differentiation of the body and the self provides a deeper
understanding of how Mead categorized the nature of the self. The body cannot see itself as a
whole. This seems like an obvious claim as we can easily see our hands, for example, but we
cannot directly see our backs.15 He states, “The body does not experience itself as a whole, in
the sense in which the self in some way enters into the experience of the self.”16 This seems
to insinuate that the self is able to “sense” each of its own aspects. Mead notes that this
ability is related to reflexibility. The self is reflexive as it “can be both subject and object.”17
Thus, reflexively, the self is able to enter into its own experience through its ability to be
aware of both perspectives as the object of experience and the subject of experience; the self
is able to sense each of its own aspects. Mead makes this distinction in order to bring out “the
characteristic of the self as an object to itself.”18
All these different claims I am putting forth from Mead are done so to show support
for the development of the self as a social structure. Specifically put:
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly,
from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social
group or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which
he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly
or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only insofar as he
Mead. Social Psychology. 41
Mead. Social Psychology. 200.
16 Mead. Social Psychology. 201
17 Mead. Social Psychology. 201
18 Mead. Social Psychology. 201
14
15
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first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or
are in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the
attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or
context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved.19
This paragraph seems to be the bedrock of Mead’s theory of how the self arises. The
individual experiences himself as a “self” indirectly. Meaning, we become aware of the self
through other’s experiences. When an individual is a part of a social group, the social group
holds some sort of set of norms which categorize the individuals who are a part of that group.
The individual, then, is like everyone else in that social group, thus he sees himself the same
way others a part of the social group would see him. When you consider how a person
experiences, they are the subject of their experience and the others, who are a part of the
experience, are the objects of the experience. It is similar to the way in which a sentence
works. Although the individual is the subject, the one experiencing by interacting with
objects who are a part of the experience, we come to know our “self” by experiencing our
“self” as the object, that is, the part of the experience that is being experienced upon. This
occurs because the individual is able to be reflective and put their self in the position as the
object of the group’s sentence. Meaning, we are able to become an object in our own
experience through our ability to take the attitudes of others towards ourselves and
internalize them in a way that objectifies us in our own experience.

19

Mead. Social Psychology. 202-203

9

Section II: George Herbert Mead on the Subject / Object and I / Me Distinction
To better understand how one becomes an object to himself, we have to further
consider self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is best defined, by Mead, as “an awakening
in ourselves of the group of attitudes which we are arousing in others,” and when made
aware of those attitudes, self-consciousness becomes “the ability to call out in ourselves a set
of definite responses which belong to others of the group.”20 Or, in other words, selfconsciousness is the ability to emulate those attitudes of the social group of which one is a
part.21
Self-consciousness, then, is essential to the development of the self. The ability to be
aware of the attitudes of members of our social group and emulate those attitudes is directly
linked to the way in which Mead defines the mind. Mead considers the development of the
mind as a product of social evolution. He states:
The essential condition for the appearance of what has been conceived of as
mind is that the individual in acting with reference to the environment should,
as part of the action, be acting with reference to himself, so that his action would
include himself as an object … If this is attained, the self as an object becomes
a part of the acting individual, that is, the individual has attained what is called
self-consciousness – a self-consciousness that accompanies his conduct or may
accompany a portion of his conduct.22
It is a condition of the mind that allows for one to refer to themself as an object. When one is
able to act in reference to their self and in reference to their environment, then the individual
is able to attain self-consciousness; once self-consciousness is attained, the individual is able
to call out the set of attitudes that belong to the environment of which they are a part. This is
able to occur because “it is this ability to control our environment that gives us what we term

Mead. Social Psychology. 227
Self-consciousness is not to be confused with consciousness. Consciousness “simply has reference to the field
of experience.” (Mead 227)
22 Mead, Social Psychology. 95
20
21
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‘mind.’”23 The mind is a fundamental aspect of our experience because it allows us to
objectify our “self.”
Mead further explains how the self can be an object through the process of going
through an experience of readjustment in response to stimuli, which is possible through selfconsciousness. He states:
In conduct within which readjustment must take place before the act is
completed, there is at least a place for such an involution as that of making one’s
self an object in acting with reference to the environment. Given such a
situation, in which because of conflict, readjustment must take place, the
function of making one’s self an object seems to lie entirely in so pointing out
to one’s self the different characters of things that a readjustment of responses
will become possible.24
By readjustment, Mead is referring to the ability to respond in the way in which the
environment requires through a “trial-and-error process” until one finds themself adjusting
“to the field of stimulations.”25 Responding to stimuli through a trial-and-error process makes
the self an object. As the self becomes an object, two things are implied: “first, that the
individual indicates things and their characters to others, and second, that the stimulus of
which he makes use is one to which he tends to respond in the same fashion as that in which
the others respond.”26 By responding the same way in which others respond, one becomes the
object of their own experience rather than the subject.
As previously mentioned, if we consider experience like a sentence, the subject is the
person or thing doing something, and the object is having something done to it. In adjusting
in the same way others are adjusting, the individual becomes a “self” by becoming like others
through objectifying his personhood. This is an essential function of an individual because

Mead. Social Psychology. 41
Mead. Social Psychology. 96
25 Mead. Social Psychology. 97
26 Mead. Social Psychology. 99
23
24
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“in the experience of the individual a self has arisen to serve the functions of reflectively
attaching to things and their characters [as] the results of past experience and of indicating
and isolating the meanings of things.”27 The self, by its very nature, is reflexive, that is, both
subject and object. Because it is reflexive, it can be reflective about its experiences in order
to isolate the norms of an experience to reflect them as the object. Reflectiveness is directly
related to the self-conscious as it is the “essential condition, within the social process, for the
development of the mind.”28 The self is innately reflexive, and self-consciousness and the
mind are what allow an individual to be reflective. The ability to reflectively attach to
experiences allows for the objectification of the self.
Before the self can be understood as a subject, it must develop through social
experiences. Mead states that it is “impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social
experience,” and that “after a self has arisen, it in a certain sense, provides for itself its social
experiences, and so we can conceive of an absolutely solitary self.”29 Thus, the self must
develop through social experiences and because it develops through social experiences, it can
give itself a social experience: the social experience in which one can converse with one’s
self. In giving itself a social experience, the subject arises. This claim can be further
explained through Mead’s words:
That process to which I have just referred, of responding to one’s self as another
responds to it, taking part in one’s own conversation with others, being aware
of what one is saying and using that awareness of what one is saying to
determine what one is going to say thereafter – that is a process with which we
are all familiar … We are finding out what we are going to say what we are
going to do, by saying and doing, and in the process are continually controlling
the process itself.30

Mead. Social Psychology. 99
Mead. Social Psychology. 196
29 Mead. Social Psychology. 204
30 Mead. Social Psychology. 205
27
28
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As the self is reflexive by nature, one is able to be reflective towards themself and their social
environment. In the process of reflecting with one’s self, the self becomes an object to itself,
i.e., the subject. Through the social experience of the object and the subject, we, as an
individual, come to know what we are going to say and do. Mead states: “the person should
be responding to himself is necessary to the self, and it is this sort of social conduct which
provides behavior within which that self appears.”31 Accordingly, we can understand this
presentation of Mead’s ideology as that of the dialectic self, necessarily.
Throughout this summation, it is necessary to explicate Mead’s theory of “I” and
“me.” To do so, one first must consider all the pieces that play a role in the definition of the
“I” and “me.” This is not to be mistaken with the typical understanding in language when the
word “I” or “me” is used. Those are mere referential pronouns to our person, while the “I”
and “me” discussed in this project are utilized in such a way to understand the nature of the
“self” as a social structure. In this way, claims have been put forth to show how the self
arises and the ways in which the self could be understood. Mead puts forth this distinction
between the “I” and “me” not “to raise the metaphysical question of how a person can be
both ‘I’ and ‘me’ but to ask for the significance of this distinction from the point of view of
conduct itself.”32 The “I” and the “me” ought to be considered to best understand the way in
which we conduct ourselves, or the way in which we act in a social context as a social
structure.
The “me” is the object, while the “I” is the subject. Mead asserts that the “‘I’ reacts to
the self which arises through the taking of the attitudes of others. Through replicating those
attitudes, we have introduced the ‘me’ and we react to it as an ‘I.’”33 Thus, the relationship

Mead. Social Psychology. 206
Mead. Social Psychology. 229
33 Mead. Social Psychology. 229
31
32
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between the “I” and the “me” is dialectical. The “me” is constituted by the attitudes that the
individual takes on, and the “I” is constituted by the collection of responses. This occurs
because, “insofar as the individual arouses in himself the attitudes of the others, there arises
an organized group of responses,” which is due to the abilities of self-consciousness.34
Therefore, the “me,” as a collection of attitudes from the environment, necessitates an “I,” as
a collection of responses to those attitudes.
What further differentiates the “I” from the “me” is the way in which the individual
experiences each. The individual is aware of the “me,” as “the self he is aware of.”35 The “I”
for the individual, or the response, “he does not know and nobody else knows,” because, “the
response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experience is uncertain, and it is that
which constitutes the ‘I.’”36 The individual is only aware of their “I” “after he has carried out
the act.” 37 We are not aware of how we will respond as an “I” until we respond because the
“I” is experiential. Together, the “I” and the “me,” they “constitute a personality as it appears
in social experience.”38 Ultimately, Mead concludes that the “self is essentially a social
process going on with these two distinguishable phases.”39 These phases come together
dialectically: a dialectical self.

Mead. Social Psychology. 230
Mead. Social Psychology. 230
36 Mead. Social Psychology. 230
37 Mead. Social Psychology. 230
38 Mead. Social Psychology. 233
39 Mead. Social Psychology. 233
34
35
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Section III: Summation of Mead; “Oppression and Self” Argument
The previous section presents a charitable reading of Mead’s theory of the self as
created through social process by including all of the factors that are necessary in
understanding the self as a social process. To understand the self in a larger context, and to
best refer to it throughout the rest of the project, it is best to put forth a summation in an
order where each point builds off of the previous:
1. Self as Socialized: We as individuals have evolved into social organisms.
Social organization gives birth to elements which are involved in the
development of the self, meaning the self develops.40 The self can only
develop through social process, experience, and activity.41
2. Self as Reflexive: The self and the body differ in that the self is reflexive,
meaning, the self “in some way enters into the experience of the self.”42 In
other words, the self can be both subject and object.
3. Development Necessitates Self-Consciousness: One such element involved in
the development of the self that is necessary within social activity is selfconsciousness, which is the ability to recognize and reflect on the environment
we are in.43 Self-consciousness is also what allows an individual to take the
attitude of the environment to which he belongs.44 Furthermore, it allows an
individual to understand their self as an object.
4. Self as Object and “Me”: One enters their own experience as a self indirectly
by understanding himself as an object to others, as others are objects to him.45
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As the self is comprised of two phases (the “I” and “me”), he partially sees his
self, and his self is, the way others see it. In responding the same way in
which others respond, this is the object phase of his experience rather than the
subject. In adjusting in the same way others are adjusting, the individual
becomes an object by becoming like others through objectifying his
personhood. This phase of the self is understood as “me,” which is constituted
by the attitudes that the individual takes on. The “me” is the phase of which
the individual is aware.
5. Self as Subject and “I”: After the “me” has developed as an object, it provides
for itself its social experiences through its reflexivity. It is a social experience
in which one can converse with one’s self, which is the subject or “I.” As
“me” is the attitudes that the individual takes on and conveys, the “I” or the
subject is the set of responses to those attitudes. Though, the individual, nor
anyone else, will not be aware of what those responses will be until after the
act occurs. The collection of responses that the “I” represents may be known,
but the way in which the “I” will actually respond is not known until the “me”
responds or acts: “It is in memory that the ‘I’ is consistently present in
experience.”46
Thus, the self is phases that develop through the process of social experience. We first
experience our self the way others experience us on the basis of the social group of which we
are a part. As we develop as an object, we do so by taking on the attitudes of the social group
that we are a part of and display them back to the social group, and that is the self that they
see and interact with, i.e. one’s “me.” This is made possible through self-consciousness. In
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taking on the attitudes of others, this necessitates an “I” or set of responses. Once we
respond, our “I” becomes the “me.” Thus, “the self is essentially a social process going on
with these two distinguishable phases.”47
Given this understanding of Mead’s theory of the self, it can be better understood that
oppression can affect the self. The argument for this position is as follows:48
(P1) If the structure of the self allows the self to be able to be socially affected (A), then
social phenomena can affect the self (B).
-Social phenomena cannot affect the self if there is nothing about the structure of the
self that allows it to be socially affected.
(P2) The structure of the self makes the self able to be socially affected (A).
-Supporting Argument for (P2): (P1) If the self is a consequence of the social process
(R), then there is necessarily something about the structure of the self that makes it able
to be socially affected (A). (P2) Mead's theory of the self situates the self as a
consequence of the social process (R). Therefore, (A) there is something about the
structure self that makes it able to be socially affected.
(C1) Therefore, social phenomena can affect the self (B).
(P3) If a social phenomenon is an event that is observed to exist within a social context (P),
then oppression is a social phenomenon (Q).
(P4) Social phenomenon is an event that is observed to exist within a social context (P).49
(C2) Therefore, oppression is a social phenomenon.50
(C3) Hence, oppression can affect the self.
As it is proven that oppression can affect the self, given the nature of the self put forth by
Mead, the next step is to understand (1) the particular social environment in which the self
may be oppressed, and (2) the ontology of the self while oppressed.
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Section IV: Mead in a New Light
Before expanding upon Mead, I want to revisit the project at hand. If an
individual is oppressed, then that sort of social experience of an oppressed identity is
one that will affect the self, specifically in terms of the “I” and “me.” To consider and
justify this claim further, and to understand just how it will affect the self, it is my
intent to analyze Mead’s theory in order to understand what oppression can do to the
self. Mead’s theory of the self is important to consider as it is completely based on
one’s interactions in society and on the basis of how we conduct ourselves. If we are
to consider the effect of oppression on the self, as oppression is a social phenomenon,
it follows that the nature of the self is one that is dependent on social interaction.
Mead puts forth an effective theory of the self in order to claim that the self is
essentially comprised of a social process, that is, the self is a social structure. It is my
purpose now to consider one of the implications that this theory puts forth in order to
elucidate the ontology of the self while oppressed.
The implication that is necessary to address arises in discussion of how the self is in
different social circumstances. Mead states:
We divide ourselves up in all sorts of different selves with reference to our
acquaintances. We discuss politics with one and religion with another. There
are all sorts of different selves answering to all sorts of different social
reactions. It is the social process itself that is responsible for the appearance of
the self; it is not there as a self apart from this type of experience.51
Although it seems to be the case that as the self is influenced by and develops because of the
social environment, there is a question that needs to be addressed: is the self actually
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different in different social situations or is the self merely appearing to be different? Mitchell
Aboulafia, too, addresses this question:
For Mead, the “Me” arises in relationship to systems of behaviors, generalized
others, and, therefore, is by definition multiple, although the behaviors of
various “Me's” can overlap. Further, Freud's model assumes a determinism that
is not inherent in the relationship of the “I” to the “Me.” Not only does the “I”
initiate novel responses, its new behaviors can become part of a “Me.” In other
words, “Me's” are not static. They are systems that often undergo
transformation.52
The “I” creates novel experiences that, through action, become a part of the “me,”53 which
arises due to a specific social environment. The “me” is not static as it changes on the basis
of the social environment or by the “generalized others” who assert the attitudes that the
“me” takes on. The self is constantly growing, developing, influenced, and thus, changed by
the different environments of which the individual becomes a part. Mead asserts that the self
is different in different social environments rather than merely appearing to be different.
I mention this aspect of Mead’s theory because there is something at stake with this
view of the self. What is at stake here is that if it is the case that the self continually changes
on the basis of the environment, then there cannot be a self that persists. Aboulafia also
presents similar worries in an article titled, “George Herbert Mead and the Unity of the Self.”
In this article, he considers Mead’s “various uses of the term self. ”54 He states that “it should
seem pathological when there is no connection between these personalities or selves.”55 Is it
the case that an individual has as many selves as environments they are a part of, or is there
something that connects the individual throughout each space allowing the self to persist? In

Mitchel Aboulafia. 2016. "George Herbert Mead,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/mead/>
53 That is to say, there are other parts that comprise the “me,” like the attitudes of the generalized other.
54 Mitchell Aboulafia. 2016. “George Herbert Mead and the Unity of the Self,” European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy [Online], VIII-1, URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/465
55 Aboulafia. “Unity of the Self.” 207
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thinking more about this question, one must consider whether or not Mead is right in thinking
that the self is different rather than appearing to be different. Thus, there is a question of
whether or not “self” is merely in reference to the “I” / “me” phases. But, in this instance,
the self would be something that is different depending on the environment the individual is
in. Another option would be to consider whether or not one’s self is merely the “I” rather
than the “me.” Although, in this instance, the self could never be preliminarily or
immediately known, as the “I” is known only through a retrospection of action.
Additionally, one may consider that the “me” is the part that is appearing to change while the
“I” is persisting. This, though, does not make sense either. It is contradictory for a set of
responses to persist as the responses are dependent on the set of attitudes which are
constantly changing dependent on the social environment.
Lastly, and more likely, the self is a way in which we experience, or in other words,
the self is the structure of experience. What I mean by this is that although the social
environment may change and thus the set of attitudes, the way in which we engage in each of
these environments as “I’s” and “Me’s” (the structure) persists. It may be the case that the
“me” is different in different social spaces, but the structure remains the same. Therefore, it is
important to consider the way in which the “me” and “I” are in action, as these phases affect
the self as the social environment shifts. Consequently, in action “the real self that appears in
the act awaits the completion of the act itself … It is that ‘I’ which we may be said to be
continually trying to realize, and to realize through the actual conduct itself.”56 As the “I,”
that is, the response to the attitudes’ of the others, is continually trying to be realized, we
have to consider how the “I” comes through in social environments.
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The way an individual is different in different social environments is important to
consider because it will play a role in understanding if and how oppression affects the self.
Mead briefly discusses a social situation that occurs, and as a result, affects the self. He
addresses this when talking about impulsive conduct. He states:
Impulsive conduct is uncontrolled conduct. The structure of the ‘me’ does not
there determine the expression of the ‘I.’ If we use a Freudian expression, the
‘me’ is in a certain sense a censor. It determines the sort of expression which
can take place, sets the stage, and gives cue. In the case of impulsive conduct
this structure of the ‘me’ involved in the situation does not furnish to any such
degree this control.57
Although Mead explicitly says that impulsive conduct is uncontrolled conduct, he implies
that impulsive conduct is uncensored conduct by the “me,” which is determined by the
environment. Thus, in acting in opposition of the social environment one is in, one’s conduct
is categorized as uncensored, or later noted as unconventionalized. In this instance, the “I”
and “me” are in dissonance.
As the attitudes may be different in different social environments, in some
environments for some individuals, there are attitudes that will create stress leading to a
dissonance. Mead makes note of instances where this stress can be too great – which creates
a dissonance between the phases of the self. One must consider the nature of this “stress” and
whether that is the only condition of the self while being oppressed.58 What complicates the
explanation of the self further is the complexity of social groups or environments – often
affected by identity.59 Different readings of Mead take in consideration the complexity of
social groups when analyzing the self, one of which notes:
The point is not that there is no integration, rather that integration in historical
reality is always short of complete and that conflict and “incoherence” (or:
Mead. Social Psychology. 238
Oppression is more substantial than everyday social group kinds of stressors.
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imbalance, dissonance, disintegration) are normal features of social life…
incoherence is not only a practical reality but an inherent quality of social
organization.60
What this quote entails is that given the structure of the self and of social groups,
incoherence, or dissonance, is a given aspect of social organization. This dissonance, then, is
inevitable as the “I” and “me” phases are dialectical. By merely being a part of a social
group, one may experience stress. As stress may be an inevitable aspect of being a member
of a social group, the dissonance serves as a necessary condition but not necessarily the only
condition of the self while oppressed. Meaning, if the self is oppressed there will be a
dissonance, but there is something else besides this dissonance that is occurring. Considering
the relationship between identity and the self, as one is oppressed on the basis of identity,
could further elucidate the ontology of the self while oppressed.
The self develops as an object or “me” through a social process, the object, “me,” or
set of attitudes demand a set of responses which constitute the subject or the “I.” It may be
the case that the “me” constitutes a different self for each environment, but the “I,” in some
cases, can overtake the socialized “me,” in order to express its self against the attitudes of the
social environment they are in. In these instances, an individual, I believe, would be able to
express themself through their identities based on social group membership or societal
norms. The definition of identity, how identity works, and its relation to the socialized self
will be further explored in the next chapter in order to consider how identity works within
Mead’s theory of the self.

60 Peter Singlmann. 1972. "Exchange as Symbolic Interaction: Convergences between Two Theoretical
Perspectives." American Sociological Review. v. 37, no. 4. 420 (Emphasis added on dissonance).
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Chapter Two: On the Nature of Identity and Oppression
A theory of the self that is understood through an individual’s (or a social organism’s)
social interaction is fundamental to my understanding of how we as social organisms grow,
develop, and exist in the way that we do, given the self is a social structure and the lens in
which we experience. In putting forth a charitable reading of Mead’s theory of the self, the
self is better understood as a product of the social process, i.e. the interactions one has with
the generalized other. It is my purpose now to consider what role identity plays in social
interaction with the generalized other. This is especially important to consider as oppression
is done on the basis of identity. This consideration, then, will come to fruition through
presenting a theory of identity, considering how identities are intelligible, and lastly through
an understanding of how they are imposed or taken. After considering what identity is,
oppression can best be defined. This step is crucial as it is perfectly situated within the
overall purpose of the project, that is, explaining how oppression affects the self.
The particular social interaction of interest comes from a social situation “where the
structure of the ‘me’ does not determine the expression of the ‘I,’” and the perceived limits of
the social situation are not observed.1 Meaning, the set of responses that the “I” has is not
dependent on the set of attitudes that an individual has, which is the “me.” As mentioned in
the previous chapter, in the case of a situation such as this, a dialectical dissonance between
the “I” and “me” can cause one to disregard the limits of social convention. It is the purpose
of this chapter, because oppression works on the basis of identity, to consider how identity
plays a role in social interaction, and how imposed or taken identities can cause a dialectical
dissonance resulting in the “I” to be uncensored by the “me,” which we see is a result of
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stress. Thus, first, identity ought to be defined. After providing a definition, we can then
consider the ways in which identity is imposed, taken, and intersects, and then define
oppression and understand how it works within social groups.
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Section I: Defining Identity and its Implications
In defining identity, there are several routes that those who study identity take. What I
would like to first consider, though, is the difference between descriptors that contribute to
one’s identity, and which sort of descriptors that contribute “only to trivial descriptions of the
person.”2 It is important to make this distinction to best define what it means to be oppressed
on the basis of identity, and in order to do so, one must differentiate between the kinds of
identities that are often oppressed (intelligible identities)3 and mere descriptions. To better
understand this distinction and shift to oppressed identities, I want to first begin with Georgia
Warnke, who, in Rethinking Race, Sex, and Gender, considers the canonical ideologies
surrounding identity, moves away from them, and considers the aforementioned distinction.4
In Warnke’s introduction, she lays the groundwork for her project at hand. She begins
her introduction building off of the claims that David Copp puts forth in order to clarify her
question of focus.5 While she states Copp “is not interested in the question of what it is to be
or to be identified as a homosexual, an African American or a woman. Rather, the question
[Copp] asks is what role these identities play in our moral psychology.”6 She differs from
Copp in that she is interested in answering the question of what those aforementioned
“identities and identifications are.”7 This is significant as she claims:
the way we identify ourselves and others is a way of understanding who or what
we and they are. That is, it may be that the identities we take seriously today
are ones with social and historical causes that constructed people as certain
kinds of people.8

2 Georgia Warnke. 2008. After Identity: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Gender. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. ProQuest Ebook Central. 1
3 This will be explained further.
4 Warnke. After Identity. 1
5 Warnke. After Identity. 1
6 Warnke. After Identity. 2
7 Warnke. After Identity. 2
8 Warnke. After Identity. 6
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This “we” she mentions seems to be referring to the collective of those who are situated
within this American ideology. Within our society in the United States, identities that are
socially and historically caused, then, are tools utilized to understand ourselves and those
around us. So much so, people become certain kinds of people based on those identities.
Thus, the identities that we ascribe to ourselves and to others mean what they mean and do
what they do because they are situated within a social and historical context that comes along
with assumptions and connotations. These are referred to as intelligible identities.
Warnke further supports this claim of identity as a means of understanding ourselves
and each other within a social context by comparing it to understanding a text through a
hermeneutic approach. She says that “when we ask who someone is, we are asking the same
sort of question we ask when we want to know what the meaning of a particular text is; we
are trying to understand the person’s ‘meaning.’” 9 When considering a text or reading a text
we inevitably have questions about the thing in which we are engaged; often that question is
about its meaning in order to get a better grasp or understanding of the text. Thus, when
asking who someone is, and as they respond with the various identities that they hold to be
true about themselves, we take this response and it aids in our understanding of said
individual: “Our self-identities and the ways we identify others are modes of reading
individuals.”10 She goes on further to show the benefits of a hermeneutic approach:
hermeneutic premises project unity on texts and look to a standard of coherence
as a criterion for revising interpretive projections of meaning that cannot be
integrated with one another. If one’s understanding of a part of the text cannot
be integrated with the meaning one has projected for the whole, one has to
revise either one’s understanding of the part or one’s understanding of the
whole … The hermeneutic circle supports a radically situational account of
identity.11

Warnke. After Identity. 6
Warnke. After Identity. 14
11 Warnke. After Identity. 224
9

10

26

Here, she shows that identity should be understood through a hermeneutic circle because
identity is not to be understood in a vacuum. When considering texts, hermeneutics allows
for a unity between different interpretations and conflicting interpretations of parts of the
text, in regard to the meaning of the whole by putting forth “coherence as the main criterion
for assessing their viability.”12
Warnke presents three “characteristics” of textual (hermeneutic) understanding that
can be connected to identity as a means of understanding.13 The first characteristic is that
“our understanding of texts is situated.”14 She supports this characteristic: “We do not come
at our texts with a fresh eye but instead with one that is pre-oriented towards the text in a
certain way because of the culture and traditions in which we have been socialized.”15 By
“situated,” Warnke is noting that just as a text is read from the perspective of an individual
with their own concepts and ideals they acquired as participants in society, an identity is read
and understood in the same likeness. When an individual claims an identity or we assume an
individual identifies in a particular way, that identity is situated within our lived experience.
For example, the way that I, as a black individual, interact with someone who identifies as
white, and/or who I identify as white, is affected and is situated by the history of the United
States. It is not the case that I just interact with this person without this history and context
lingering in the background.
The next characteristic is that “our understanding of texts is purposeful.”16 She
differentiates between this characteristic and the last by saying we not only understand a text

12 Lauren Swayne Barthold. 2016. A Hermeneutic Approach to Gender and other Social Identities. 1st edition.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. 43
13 Warnke. After Identity. 6
14 Warnke. After Identity. 6
15 Warnke. After Identity. 6
16 Warnke. After Identity. 6
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“from a certain perspective and not only within a certain framework of assumptions and
concerns,” but we also “have certain hopes and expectations for the text, certain reasons for
reading it, and particular worries we would like it to address.”17 Similarly, when considering
our or another’s identity, with that identity comes certain expectations. It follows, then, that
there may be (and are) several expectations of me, as a black, masculine-presenting
individual, that are well known through the commonly recognized stereotypes of black men.
For example, this could include the ways in which I am expected to emote, walk, talk, or
even act.
Lastly, in building off of the previous two characteristics, she states that in
considering the understanding of a particular text, “we are prepared for different
interpretations of the text’s meaning.”18 Just as we come to a text with our own assumptions,
perspectives, or expectations, “others have and will understand it differently than we do,” and
they will also “bring a different framework of attitudes, expectations, and concerns to it at
different points” in their lives.19 Therefore, anyone’s understanding at any given point is
incomplete, changing as the framework changes. This is the same for identity. As many
people as there are, there are that many frameworks of attitudes, expectations, and concerns.
With each individual we meet we approach that individual and their ways of identifying
through our own unique frameworks that are affected by the context we live in. In summary,
Warnke “[suggests] that our understanding of a person’s identity is likewise situated,
purposefully oriented, and partial.”20 Thus, the hermeneutic approach to identity is beneficial
because it shows how identity can be utilized as a tool to understand how individuals (here,
in a Western, United States, stereotypical context) are situated within this society.
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In putting forth this reading of identity, Warnke asserts that identity is contextual. She
goes further, though, to present a caution:
Even within the historical and cultural settings in which we can be understood
as black, white, Asian or [Latinx] and in which we can be understood as females
or males, men or women, we cannot only or always be understood in any of
these ways. Particular historical and cultural contexts may give rise to racial,
sexed, and gendered identities. It is a further point to say that only particular
contexts within those broader historical and cultural frameworks can include
raced, sexed, or gendered individuals as intelligible “parts.”21
This is incredibly important to note as some philosophers do not address how identity is
different in different contexts outside of our own Western perspective. There are times in a
person’s life when race or gender are not considered intelligible parts. By intelligible parts,
Warnke is pointing to the identities that an individual possesses that are intelligible or a mode
of understanding who or what we or another individual are – the identities that are used as a
means of understanding or situating. When she states that there are contexts in a person’s life
when their intelligible identities are not considered intelligible, she explains this further by
noting that “is not just that these identities are irrelevant in most circumstances. It is, instead,
that they are misunderstandings of who and what we are.”22 To be identified as or situated by
the identity “African-American” does not apply to those who are not a part of the context of
the United States. For example, if a black individual who was born and raised in England
traveled to the United States and was identified as an African-American, that would be a
misunderstanding of who they are. What it means to be African-American in the United
States and what it means to be black in England are different because the contexts are
different; “Hence, if race, gender, and sex are to be intelligible identities, the contexts of
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which they are a part must be more precisely defined.”23 This means that if identity is context
dependent, which it is, the next thing that ought to be defined is the context.24 Thus, “an
identity is never either the whole of who we are or who we always are. Rather, who we are
depends upon the context in which the question arises and the purposes for which it is
asked.”25

Warnke. After Identity. 246
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Section II: Identity Imposed and Identity Taken: Race, Gender, and Sexuality
Though I agree with this understanding of identity, I think perhaps there is a place
where Warnke could be supplemented, for her analysis is incomplete. Her claim in question
is as follows: “only particular contexts within those broader historical and cultural
frameworks can include raced, sexed, or gendered individuals as intelligible parts.”26 Here,
she asserts that race, gender, and sex can only be considered intelligible (as in, a means of
understanding) in particular contexts.27 Though I agree, where she can be supplemented is
through the fact that there is often a difference between the way we see and understand
ourselves and the way others see and understand us. Warnke’s claim holds true in regards to
the way others are understood through identities imposed but not necessarily about the way
we see ourselves through the identities we take. This difference can be better explained
through Robert Gooding-Williams in “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,”28 which is
further supported and complemented by Lee McBride, III in “New Descriptions, New
Possibilities.”29
Gooding-Williams considers the difference between identities imposed and identities
taken through “drawing a distinction between being black and being a black person.”30
McBride articulates and explains this distinction well. He states, “Being black is understood
as a consequence of a practice of racial categorization to which blacks have been subjected.
Being black is thus socially constructed and imposed … As such, ‘being black’ expresses a
third-person perspective.”31 This falls in line with what Warnke is claiming. Being black is
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understood in a particular way that is dependent on context. Gooding-Williams furthers this,
though, in saying that this is a categorization to which black folk have been subjected, thus it
is imposed or placed on black folk, because of the way in which it has been socially
constructed. ‘Black’ is something the he, she, or they are deemed or judged to be. Therefore,
being black expresses a third-person perspective because society is imposing this on
individuals as a means to situate folk. The accommodation to Warnke comes through when
one considers how identity can also be taken.
Being black, an identity imposed, is different than being a black person, an identity
that is taken. Being a black person “expresses a first-person perspective” because “one is a
black person only if one (1) classifies oneself as black and (2) makes choices and formulates
plans in light of one’s identification of oneself as black.”32 The first-person perspective is a
significant difference between being black and being a black person, because identifying
oneself as a black person requires an individual to make a claim about their person, their
“me” so to speak. Being a black person is something that “I,” as a personal, first-person,
pronoun, am; being black is an identity imposed by society on “him, her, or them” from the
society’s third-person perspective. Being a black person necessitates intentionality about the
way in which one sees themself, and the way in which this identity that they have taken
affects the way they want “to make choices, to formulate plans, to express concerns, and so
forth, [which is] in light of [their] identification of [themselves] as black.”33 Thus, the way an
individual exists in the social environment that they are in takes into consideration this
identity that they have taken. As a side note, this is not to say that anyone can just decide that
they are a black person, as “being black – that is, being racially categorized as black – is a
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necessary but not a sufficient condition of being a black person.”34 One must be black before
they decide to be a black person.
In Warnke’s claim, “only particular contexts within those broader historical and
cultural frameworks can include raced, sexed, or gendered individuals as intelligible parts,”
she fails to consider the way in which an individual sees themself.35 In this way, raced, sexed,
or gendered individuals continue to be intelligible in regards to the way in which a person
understand themselves. Individuals do not merely exist in order to be understood by those
around us; the way that we find ourselves to be intelligible is, I’d argue, more important.
Understanding those around us in similar ways to how we understand texts is a useful
mechanism that situates the understanding in a context. This addition, though, which asserts
that our understanding of ourselves matters too, situates ourselves not only as texts, per se,
but as authors. As authors, we present ourselves in particular ways; often, these are ways that
align with the identities we have taken. This is not to say that I will only be perceived the
way that I intend to be, but it is pertinent to recognize that there is a way in which I intend to
be seen, read, understood, or intelligible. Considering a similar example to what I presented
earlier, if I, an African-American, am roaming around in England and thus am not identified
or seen as an African-American but perhaps an African, that does not mean that my identity
as an African-American no longer means anything, is intelligible, or is a way of
understanding “me.” Being an African-American is an identity that I have taken; I am a black
person. Thus, I move around the world affected by the experiences I have had as an AfricanAmerican and as being identified as black. By being black and a black person who was born
and raised in the United States, regardless of which social environment that I may currently
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be in, the experiences I have had as this person may affect the choices I make, plans I form,
concerns I may have, and so forth.36
This differentiation between identity imposed and identity taken works not only with
race, but also with gender and sexuality. The third-person perspective of identities imposed
are imposed through their social construction and are utilized and situated in each society in
particular ways. Focusing on Western society, race, sexuality, and gender are intelligible
parts of an individual. As Warnke states, “we understand one another in terms of identities
that are parts of the histories in which we live and, in turn, understand our histories in terms
of the identities that we employ for understanding one another. These identities include sex
and gender ones.” 37 Sexuality, too, ought to be considered an intelligible identity given it is a
part of the history and reality of which we live. Throughout Warnke’s book, it seems to be
the case that she conflates sex and gender with one another, which is why I am only focusing
on gender rather than sex.
Before I try to complete the lofty task of defining sexuality and gender very briefly, I
want to address a few points. First, these concepts’ meanings, like race, are politically
charged and historically and socially situated. Thus, their meanings and the way in which
they are situated within society will continually change depending on the sociopolitical
climate.38 What I will here define and articulate for the purpose of my project is being done
in order to understand the possible ways in which an individual and/or their society can
interact and understand the identities that they take or are imposed on them.
Gooding-Williams. “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy.” 93
Warnke. After Identity. 169
38 There are several books and essays to which I will refer in order to best articulate these differences. Within
the scope of this project, though, I couldn’t possibly go in depth about these topics, nor is it pertinent for the
project at hand to produce a deep understanding rather than a general understanding that will aid in the overall
picture of oppression and the self. That being said, it is crucial that this work be done and continue to be visited
or explored; as these concepts are constantly evolving, they must be considered and analyzed in order to
consider the ways in which theses identities affect those who take them or those who have these identities
imposed on them.
36
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In showing how race, sexuality, and gender are imposed and/or taken is not to say
that these identities are all the same or that a person who identifies with a certain race, for
example, knows how a person who identifies with a certain gender is affected by or interacts
with that gender. Furthermore, this, too, is not to say the experiences that an individual has
with each of these identities will be the same. In order to describe the ways in which
sexuality and gender can be imposed or taken, I want to restate the criteria put forth by
Gooding-Williams in ubiquitous terms that can be utilized with sexuality and gender. In
order for an identity to be imposed, it must be done so as a consequence of a kind of
categorization of which individuals are subjected to, and it must take a third person
perspective. In order for an identity to be taken, an individual must (1) begin to identify (to
classify) oneself as that particular identity, and (2) make choices and formulate plans in light
of one’s identification in that particular way.39 I will go further in saying that impositions
may include expectations and stereotypes that have been tied with particular identities,
whether implicit or explicit. The first step, then, in understanding how gender and sexuality
are imposed and taken, is to define these concepts.
The way that gender is imposed on individuals is typically tied to sex because of the
way that sex is situated in our society. Gender identity “refers to one’s subjective sense of
being a boy, girl, man, woman, androgynous, agender,” nonbinary, genderqueer, and so on.40
It is also important to include the definition of gender expression when defining gender as it
“refers to one’s social presentation of gender in everyday life (through dress, bodily
comportment, vocal expressions, etc.). Gender expression may also shift across social
contexts depending on perceived safety and risks.”41 Though gender is a psychological and

This language is taken from: Gooding-Williams. “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy.” 93.
Pfeffer. Queering Families. xxxiv
41 Pfeffer. Queering Families. xxxv
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subjective phenomenon that is intentional and is often different for every person, from birth,
on the basis of sex, our gender is imposed.
Gender roles and stereotypes are engrained deeply within our society. This is because
we live in a cisnormative society: “Cisnormativity describes the collection of individual and
systemic biases and assumptions that all people are and should be cisgender and binary
(either man or woman), and by extension, that there is something wrong with people that do
not fit within this standard.”42 “Cisgender” refers to individuals who are not transgender and
is used over “‘natal male’ or ‘natal female’ since these terms obscure the ways in which both
sex and gender involve social construction”; for people who identify as cisgender, the gender
they identify with falls in line with their sex assigned at birth.43 This quote on cisnormativity
is not to pass judgement on any particular group of people, rather I include the definition to
note that in our society, we are all, often unintentionally, participants in this cisnormative
ideology because we participate in the society where cisnormativity is a norm. It is an
unintended bias.44 The imposition of gender, then, is a consequence of categorization on the
basis of sex (imposed) as a result of cisnormativity, to which individuals are subjected.
Gender imposition takes a third person perspective as it is assumed by others around you on
the basis of your gender expression.
For an identity to be taken, one must make choices and formulate plans in light of
one’s identification in that particular way. As explained earlier, in regards to race, the
difference between being black and being a black person is that of a difference between an

42 Stephanie L. Budge, and Bonnie Moradi. 2018. “Attending to Gender in Psychotherapy: Understanding and
Incorporating Systems of Power.” Journal of Clinical Psychology 74 (11): 2014-27.
43 Pfeffer. Queering Families. xxxiii
44 There is a lot of literature on cisnormativity from a queer theory perspective, but I am sure that there is room,
in other papers, to discuss the moral implications of such a bias we hold. Cisnormativity, along with racism,
colorism, sexism, and ableism (to name a few) aren’t things that are right to practice, but are often things we do
unintentionally because of the attitudes of the society that we take in. Often lives are spent unlearning these
ideologies.
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identity imposed versus an identity taken. Gender can be explained in the same likeness. On
one hand, because gender imposition is based on the prescribed norms of sex ingrained in our
society, someone may be identified as a female (at birth or throughout life). On the other
hand, one can identify as a woman or take on the identity of a woman, their gender, by
making choices and formulating plans in light of her identification in that way. One example
of taking gender can be explicated through the denial of gender imposition; this is a common
experience for folks who identify as transgender.
Sexuality is also an identity that can be imposed or taken. Sexuality is: “The bodily,
emotional, sociocultural, and intellectual aspects of one’s self which impact on and articulate
one’s sexual identity and whom or what one desires as sexual partners.”45 Sexuality, here, is
not only what gender you are sexually attracted to but also it encompasses your sexual
identity. Sexual identity refers to your identity as it relates to your sexual (or asexual) acts.
As noted earlier, we live in a cisnormative society where the norm is that all individuals are
cisgender and those genders are binary (male or female) – this, of course, is imposed.
Cisnormativity is also included within the norm of heteronormativity: a term that is
“generally understood within queer theory as a theoretical concept in which patriarchy and
heterosexuality are centered as the social norm and all other genders, sexualities, and sexual
expressions are cast as deviant.”46 As this is a norm within our society, it has become an
expectation that every individual is heterosexual, and heterosexuality is thus imposed.
Heterosexuality is a default categorization that everyone is assumed to hold because of its
position in our society; this is why there is the phenomenon of “coming out,” as not being
straight is deemed deviant. Sexuality is taken, then, by classifying one’s own sexuality in a

Gabriele Griffin. 2017. "Sexuality." In A Dictionary of Gender Studies. Oxford University Press
Juan Battle and Colin Ashley. 2008. “Intersectionality, Heteronormativity, and Black Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
and Transgender (LGBT) Families.” Black Women, Gender & Families 2 (1). University of Illinois Press. 1
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particular way, and as a result, they are making choices and formulating plans in light of their
sexuality. In taking this identity, there is a first-person perspective.
Because sexuality, gender, and race are intelligible identities, these identities are ways
that individuals are understood in particular contexts. What is essentially shown through the
explication of how these identities can be imposed or taken is that (1) individuals are
subjected to impositions that are often based on stereotypes and expectations (as articulated
by Warnke), which come from categorizations to which we are subjected. This is not to say,
either, that individuals are always active in the process of imposing identities on each other.
Often, imposition occurs because of implicit biases that have been left unaddressed and
unlearned. And (2), the process of taking an identity is an active one. By active, I mean to say
that in taking this particular identity, an individual is doing something – identifying themself
in that particular way and making choices or plans in light of their identification in that
particular way. This rings especially true in terms of race, gender, and sexuality.47

This is not to say that these are the only identities that are intelligible or are imposed or taken. Class, for
example, would be a good addition to the list.
47
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Section III: Oppression
As previously noted, intelligible identities are understood in particular ways
depending on the context. The position at hand essentially states that in particular contexts,
certain identities are understood in ways that are oppressive. The purpose of this section is to
understand what oppression is and how oppression is connected to the creation of social
groups. This, too, is connected with Mead’s theory of the self. As the self develops socially,
social interaction is critical to its existence. Oppression, then, is detrimental to self
development as oppression is a social phenomenon. Developing as the object of others’
experiences, the self takes on the attitudes of others; oppression, in effect, will affect the selfconcept of the oppressed person by an internalization of the norms put forward by the
oppressive group.
Oppression ought to be defined and then clarified in terms of how oppression is a
social construct and phenomenon that works within social groups. Mead’s theory of the self
is dependent on the assumption that we are social creatures. Given this assumption, these
constructs that we have made and have socially integrated into the very fabric of our social
groups, have to be considered in terms of the social group in which it works. To define
oppression, I look to Marilyn Frye, an American philosopher and feminist theorist.48 To
consider how oppression works as a social phenomenon and within social groups, I consider
Iris Marion Young’s “Five Faces of Oppression.”49
In an anthology of Frye’s works, she discusses oppression in two separate essays. In
one essay appropriately titled, “Oppression,” she states that “we need to think clearly about

48 Marilyn Frye. 1983. “Oppression.” The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Berkeley: Crossing
Press.
49 Iris Marion Young. 2014. “Five Faces of Diversity.” Diversity, Social justice, and Inclusive Excellence:
Transdisciplinary and Global Perspective. edited by Seth N. Asumah, and Mechthild Nagel. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
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oppression, and there is much that mitigates against this … I want to make clear what is
being said when we say it. We need this word, this concept, and we need it to be sharp and
sure.”50 It seems to be incredibly important to start the essay in this way as she notes that the
word “oppression” is often misused, and it is pertinent to be clear, first, about what is being
said before the word is used. She begins by considering the word’s etymology: “The root of
the word ‘oppression’ is the element ‘press.’… Something pressed is something caught
between or among forces and barriers which are so related to each other that jointly they
restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion or mobility.”51 Given this etymology, to
oppress there must be forces and barriers that create a space of no movement. Oppression,
then, is explicitly defined as:
a system of interrelated barriers and forces which reduce, immobilize and mold
people who belong to a certain group, and effect their subordination to another
group (individually to individuals of the other group, and as a group, to that
group). Such a system could not exist were not the groups, the categories of
persons, well defined.52
With this definition, Frye states what oppression is, but there are ideas that are implied that
need to be expounded upon.
Within this quote, she notes two things. (1) Oppression is a system of connected
barriers and forces; thus, oppression is systemic. It is implied that the ability to create barriers
and forces are intertwined within the makeup of the dominant group, and in the same
likeness, the category of persons deemed lesser is grouped in order to be oppressed. This
group, as a result, is well defined. This is evident because the existence of the oppressive
group presupposes another group which it can subordinate.53 By stating that there is a

Frye. “Oppression.” 1
Fry. “Oppression.” 1
52 Marilyn Frye. 1983. “Sexism.” The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Berkeley: Crossing Press.
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53 Frye. “Sexism.” 33
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“presupposition,” Frye is conveying that in order for one group to oppress the other, there
logically must be another distinct group that can be oppressed. 54 The group, then, that has the
ability to oppress others is the dominant group that is able to utilize those barriers and forces
in order to immobilize a category of persons. Thus, to fulfill its purpose, that is, to press or
immobilize the group deemed as the other, the dominant group (2) utilizes the ability to
create barriers and forces in order to subordinate that other group. Oppression, then, is
occurring between two forces, within a double bind, where the oppressed is unable to move.
With this definition and explanation of oppression, the effects of oppression can be
better understood as it is appropriately situated. Frye states that:
The experience of oppressed people is that the living of one’s life is confined
and shaped by forces and barriers which are not accidental or occasional and
hence avoidable, but are systematically related to each other in such a way as
to catch one between and among them and restrict or penalize motion in any
direction. It is the experience of being caged in.55
The experience of oppressed people, then, is being intentionally restricted from being a part
of the “us” social group and immobilized by being othered. Oppression is inescapable and
unavoidable for those oppressed. To be oppressed is to be restricted and limited as a result of
the othering by the dominant group. As the oppressed is grouped as a result of the
categorization of “us” vs “them” social groups, social groups have to be defined.
In “Five Faces of Oppression” by Iris Marion Young, she presents different ways that
oppression will affect those oppressed. Before she explains the five different ways, she
clarifies the concept of a social group and considers oppression as a “structural concept.”56
What a social group is and how oppression is a structural concept are necessary to consider
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as oppression works within these particular contexts and is “a condition of groups.”57 As she
is considering the evolution of how the word has been used, she notes that “oppression also
refers to systemic constraints on groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of
a tyrant. Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices
or policies.”58 This is consistent with the way that oppression is framed by Frye, as they both
provide structural accounts of oppression. Young furthers Frye’s explication, though, by
making explicit what is implied in talking about the way that oppression is constructed; she
states “[oppression’s] causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in
the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following
those rules.”59 As I noted earlier while clarifying Frye’s definition, what makes a dominant
group become oppressive occurs as they form an opposing group to oppress by establishing
forces and barriers. The makeup of that oppressive group, then, is oppressive norms, habits,
symbols, or assumptions that are unexamined and accepted components of that dominant
group.
Given that the function of oppression is to oppress social groups, she tries to define
“social group”:
a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural
forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity
with one another because of their similar experience or way of life, which
prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified
with the group, or in a different way. Groups are an expression of social
relations.60
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It is important to understand what a social group is as the self develops as a result of being a
part of particular social groups. Social groups are made up of individuals who have some
shared connection of culture, practice, norms, or a way of life; these can be identifiers as a
“social group is defined not primarily by a set of shared attributes, but by a sense of
identity.”61 Social groups can contribute to the ways that identities are intelligible: “Group
meanings partially constitute people’s identities in terms of cultural forms, social situation,
and history that group members know as theirs because these meanings have been either
forced on them or forged by them or both.”62 The language of forced and forged can be
related to Gooding-Williams’ language, respectively, of imposed or taken. Even with the
creation of a group, group identity can be imposed and taken.
The purpose of this chapter was to understand oppression. As oppression works on
the basis of identity, one must note what identity is as it plays a role in understanding
ourselves and others. The explanation of social groups helps further understand their
construction in relation to oppression. This is an especially important step as the self
develops in relation to the social group of which it is a part. In summation, this understanding
provides the next step in understanding how oppression affects the self. The next chapter
furthers the understanding in how oppression can affect the self by considering the ways that
identity relates to the self. This is also important to include to best understand what may also
occur when the self is oppressed, given identity affects the self, or at least an understanding
of the self.

61
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Chapter Three: Intersectionality and the Core Sense of Self
The previous chapter worked as a means to understand oppression and identity as it
relates to the question of how oppression affects the self. Though the question does not
explicitly address identity, identity is crucial to understand because one is oppressed on the
basis of one’s identity. Identity is of focus as it is something that may distinguish oppression
from other lesser stresses that could create a dialectical dissonance. As such, in order to
understand the specific assertion, that is, that there is a conflicting imposition (by being
oppressed) placed on queer folk in black American Christian spaces that affects the self, it
must be explored how identities may intersect and relate to the way that we understand who
we are.
With an understanding of how identities can be intelligible and how they can be
imposed or taken, the next step is to consider how they interrelate. These identities do not
exist in a vacuum and the intersection of these identities can greatly affect the lives of the
individuals who have these identities. Intersectionality is important to consider and define
because, often, where identities are assumed to intersect, they may, in fact, conflict. Further,
if those identities do conflict, one must take in consideration the meaning one attributes to
said identities. Patricia Collins defines intersectionality as an “analysis claiming that systems
of race, social class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, and age form mutually constructing
features of social organization.”1 Between identities is mutuality. In the literature regarding
how multiple identities relate, it is first noted that there is a “‘framework of intersectionality’
that [recognizes] how socially constructed identities are experienced simultaneously, not

Patricia Hill Collins. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of
Empowerment. Ed. 2nd. New York: Routledge. (From Glossary.)
1
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hierarchically.”2 This is important to differentiate because the focus, when considering the
multiple identities that an individual may have, should be on how they interconnect rather
than just pointing out the ways in which individuals are similar or different.3

2Elisa S. Abes, Susan R. Jones, and Marylu K. McEwen. 2007. “Reconceptualizing the Model of Multiple
Dimensions of Identity: The Role of Meaning-Making Capacity in the Construction of Multiple Identities”
Journal of College Student Development 48 (1): 1-22
3 Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 2
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Section I: Intersectionality and the Importance of Meaning Making
There are studies regarding intersectionality within the realm of higher education
which focus on the experiences of college students. This seems appropriate as this is a time
when identity is often explored and confronted. Though I am considering these theories
presented within the realm of higher education, I do not believe that this is the only time
where one struggles with their identities. As noted before, identities are context dependent,
thus the kind of struggle one may endure because of an identity is context dependent. One
theory that is of focus was founded by Susan Jones and Marylu McEwen. Within their study,
they constructed a model of “Multiple Dimensions of Identity” that is later reconstructed:

Figure 1: Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity; Adapted from Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 4

The authors describe each aspect of the model:
The model portrays identity dimensions as intersecting rings around a core,
signifying how “no one dimension may be understood singularly; it can be
understood only in relation to other dimensions.” At the center of the model is
a core sense of self, comprising “valued personal attributes and characteristics.”
46

Surrounding the core and identity dimensions is the context in which a person
experiences her life, such as family, sociocultural conditions, and current
experiences. The salience of each identity dimension to the core is fluid and
depends on contextual influences.4
This model falls in line with the telling of identity that is previously presented by Warnke but
furthers by serving as a visual metaphor for the way identity interacts with the way we
understand ourselves. Warnke utilizes hermeneutics to consider identity in order to
emphasize the importance of the context and interrelatedness of all the ways in which we
understand ourselves and each other. Similarly, the model asserts through the intersecting
rings that all of the different aspects of an individual cannot be understood singularly, rather
only in relation to one another because there is a mutuality. Furthermore, these rings circulate
around a core which is one’s “sense of self.”5 The core, as noted in the image, could further
be categorized as one’s personal attributes, personal characteristics, and personal identity.
This further connects to Warnke in that both ideologies show that identity is a means to
understand ourselves. Identities, as the rings, circulate around our understanding of our self;
at different moments in our lives certain identities are closer to our understanding of our self,
depending on the saliency of the identity at the time. This original model is important
because it “offers a conceptual depiction of relationships among college students’ socially
constructed identity dimensions, recognizing that each dimension cannot be fully understood
in isolation.”6 Thus, this model aids in putting forth a more wholistic picture of an individual
when it comes to their identities, showing that identities should be considered

Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 3
This idea of “sense of self” and “Core” is something I will explore further. It is especially important to
deconstruct this idea further as it relates to Mead’s theory of the self. With the structure of the “I” and “me”
what does “sense of self” mean? Furthermore, what is personal identity iff the “me” is dependent on the social
environment one is in. These questions will be answered.
6 Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 3
4
5
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simultaneously, rather than hierarchically, and their importance in the understanding of one’s
self.
The purpose of these authors revisiting this model was to reconceptualize it.7 The
reconceptualization was done in order to include the concept of “meaning-making,” but also
in order to better explain the “saliency” of each identity.8 Originally, the idea of a meaningmaking structure comes from R. Kegan in 1994:
He defines meaning-making structures as sets of assumptions that determine
how an individual perceives and [organizes their] life experiences. These
structures constitute the organizing principles of how one makes sense of and
interprets the world. He explained that a person actively interprets life through
meaning-making structures, and that “there is no feeling, no experience, no
thought, no perception independent of a meaning-making context.”9
Essentially, there are assumptions that we hold that dictate the way we think about our
everyday experiences – these are the meaning-making structures. A meaning-making
structure serves as a metaphor for the assumptions that allow us to reflectively make meaning
about our everyday experiences. Given these “structures,” we accordingly have a set of
principles that each experience is filtered through in order for us to make sense of the
experience based on our context. As assumptions may change, the way we interpret the
environment may as well. These assumptions that we have internalized are serving as a
metaphor for what we do psychologically or internally during the process of understanding
the relationship between our context and our identities (which is supported through the
hermeneutical perspective of identity).

Though this model is reconstructed, it keeps this atom-esque figure, which is why in the previous paragraph I
explain it in detail.
8 Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 6
9 Susan R. Jones and Elisa S. Abes. 2013. Identity Development of College Students: Advancing Frameworks
for Multiple Dimensions of Identity. Somerset: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. 98
7
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This metaphor of a “meaning-making structure” comes to fruition within the
reconceptualized model through suggesting “that meaning-making capacity [serves] as a
filter through which contextual factors are interpreted prior to influencing self-perceptions …
How context influenced these perceptions depended on the complexity of the meaningmaking filter.”10 In other words, when one makes meaning in regard to their particular
context, then the way they perceive themselves, their identities, and how their identities
interrelate are influenced by the meaning they have arrived at in interpreting their context
through their assumptions. For example, if someone were to grow up in a culture riddled with
misogyny, then that individual may derive from that context the assumption that women
ought to be a certain way or only do certain things. Thus, if a person who identified as a
woman lived within this context, then her relationship with her identity as a woman is
affected by the meaning she derived from said context. Therefore, one’s meaning-making
capacity plays a large role in the way that context affects one’s conception of the way in
which they understand their identities based on the assumptions derived from the context.
The model revisited, then, includes a meaning making function because by
“incorporating meaning-making capacity into the model” the reconceptualized model can
“more thoroughly depict the relationship between context and salience (and self-perceptions)
of identity dimensions, as well as the relationship between social identities and the core of
identity.”11 An image of the reconceptualized model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity is
below:

10
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Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 6
Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 6
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Figure 2: Reconceptualized Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity; Adapted from Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 7

The authors describe each aspect of the model. They note that this model differs in
that it “portrays in two dimensions the interactive nature of the relationships among
components of the identity construction process: context, meaning making, and identity
perceptions.”12 Thus, the model shows that in making meaning of the context, the perception
of one’s identity is influenced. The atom component of the model serves as a way to view the
identities we take and the way that we understand how they intersect.13 The contextual
influences can relate to ways that identities are imposed and the implications of those
impositions. The meaning making filter depends on our own unique perspectives,
experiences, backgrounds, ideas, beliefs, etc., and affects the way we understand and
interpret our environment. Every person’s model will look different.

12
13

Abes. “Reconceptualizing the Model.” 6
Taken from the previous model
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Section II: Core Sense of Self and Mead
The aim of this section is to consider how concepts put forth by Warnke and
Gooding-Williams, intersectionality, and meaning-making capacity are situated within
Mead’s theory of the self. In order to understand how oppression affects the self, one must
first understand how identity affects the self, as oppression is on the basis of identity. To
explain how identity affects the self, the idea of a core sense of self, as implied through the
Reconceptualized Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity, must be elucidated and
explicated in relation to Mead’s theory.
First, I want to summarize the three main points of identity: hermeneutics, identity
imposed and taken, and intersectionality. Hermeneutics is an approach used to analyze texts.
Warnke applies this theory to considering identity because hermeneutics allows for a unity
between different interpretations and conflicting interpretations of parts of the text in regard
to the meaning of the whole. Hermeneutics as a way of considering texts has three
components that can be applied to the understanding of identity: (1) our understanding is
placed within a context and as a result is dependent on that context, (2) we have certain
expectations for those who identify in certain ways, and (3) our understanding and
expectations are incomplete. Hermeneutics, for identity, then, allows identity to be a way in
which individuals can be understood, making them intelligible, by taking in consideration the
context of which the individual is a part. Thus, our understanding of a person’s identity is
situated, purposefully oriented, partial, and is context dependent.
Gooding-Williams helps supplement Warnke by making a distinction between
identities taken and identities imposed. As previously mentioned, for an identity to be
imposed, it must be done so in consequence of a kind of categorization to which individuals
are subjected, and it must take a third person perspective. In order for an identity to be taken,
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an individual must (1) begin to identify (to classify) oneself as that particular identity, and (2)
make choices and formulate plans in light of one’s identification in that particular way.14
This distinction makes clear that even though identity is context dependent there is a
difference between the way that identity can be imposed and taken. The way that an identity
is imposed may be context dependent but the identities that we take are still taken regardless
of the context. In any case, having certain identities imposed on us or taking certain identities
will affect the way we move about in this society.
Lastly, identity is multiple, and because we often have several identities, we have to
understand how they may intersect, relate, connect, or conflict. Intersectionality is a key
component to include when considering identity because the way identities imposed or taken
interrelate, connect, or conflict will affect the way that a person sees themself or what is
understood to be the core sense of self. The models presented help elucidate how, even with
multiple identities, some can be more salient than others dependent on the context.
In understanding identity in this way, we can understand how identity affects the self
in a social environment. An identity can work as a shared way that a social environment is
intelligible. Thus, the way that the individual who is a part of a social environment or outside
of a social environment may understand an entire social group is a result of an identity that
was imposed on or taken by that social environment (this is a result of collective imposed or
taken identities). But, for each member of that social environment they may have a different
relationship with that identity because of the way that they may individually take that identity
and their own perspective. This connects to a key component that the model presents, that is,
the core sense of self, or, the way that an individual understands themself. This concept,
though, needs to be explained further and how it relates to Mead’s theory of the self.

14
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When considering the reconceptualized model, the atom part of the model has rings
with electrons (so to speak) on each ring, which symbolizes an identity that circulates around
a core. This core is described as “an inner-defined personal sense of the self, incorporating
‘valued personal attributes and characteristics.’”15 Furthermore, this core is “fluid” and
“includes personal values and aspects of identity that the individuals perceive as central to
their sense of self.”16 What is most commonly cited along with “core sense of self” are the
terms: personal identity, personal characteristics, and personal attributes. What this definition
of core seems to insinuate is that there is a particular way in which we see ourselves and
there are specific attributes, beliefs, or characteristics that we hold to be essential or valued in
our understanding of ourselves. Though these things may change, resulting in fluidity, the
core somehow differs from the identities we have that circulate around the core. At different
moments in our lives the “electron” of each identity may be closer to the “core sense of self.”
What this means is that, for example, there may be moments in life where my gender is
closer to my sense of self than my class, dependent on the context and my meaning-making
filter. The way that the rings move around the core give insight to what, at any given
moment, is more or less salient to the core, or, the attributes that give light to what I consider
to be my “core identity.”
The self, as presented in the previous chapter, is an entity that develops through the
process of social experience. The structure is comprised of two phases: the “I” (or subject)
and the “me” (or object). The “me” is understood as the attitudes that the individual takes on
based on the social environment that one is in. The “I” occurs as an effect of taking on the
attitudes of the social environment, thus becoming the set of responses to those attitudes.
Essentially, the self is a social, dialectical process occurring between these two phases:
15
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attitudes and responses. Accordingly, can there be a core sense of self, and if so, what is this
core sense of self?
This idea of a core sense of self, I believe, can only co-exist with Mead’s theory of
the self if this core is defined in a way that is synonymous with the idea of perspective, or
self-perceptions, which arises through self-consciousness. The “core sense of self” is what
allows for individuals to attribute particular characteristics, ideas, beliefs, or identities as
personal. It allows for particular identities in certain moments to seem more salient than other
identities. In allowing for different characteristics to be categorized as “personal,” they create
some sort of uniqueness about the individual that differentiates them from others. I would
argue, though, that there is nothing about the structure of the self that allows for individuals
to feel this way; rather it is one’s own perspective through self-consciousness’ ability to
create meaning through common social environments that gives rise to these feelings.
Consequently, it seems like there is a core sense of self, creating an impression of a
sense of self, rather than there actually being one. First and foremost, the nature and structure
of the self does not allow for there to be a core. This is evident through the fact that the self is
comprised of two phases that are constantly in dialect. As the conversation or the
environment that fuels the self shifts, so does the “self,” so to speak. There seems to be a core
sense of self because of the way that the self develops. The way that we understand our “self”
is through the many social environments that we contribute to, are exposed to, or are
involved in. Most of us often stay within a few select social environments resulting in only a
limited set of attitudes and responses to which we as individuals partake. Often, too, attitudes
of those different environments may overlap. Because we are constantly participating in the
same or similar social environments, a person’s “I” and “me” are not being continually
affected by new content. Thus, through a pattern of behavior or through the repetition of
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similar social behaviors, we develop an impression of a core sense of self. That is, a
particular way we think that we are, a particular set of beliefs that we partake in, or by having
a particular set of characteristics that we attribute to ourselves, all of which we deem to be
personal or essential, but in actuality, only occurs as a result of the unvarying environments
and attitudes we surround ourselves with.
This impression, though, only arises from our unique perspective. Throughout the
different social environments that an individual may engage in, the individual maintains a
unique perspective. We know that each individual has a unique perspective, because it is
what allows for each individual’s “I” to have the possibility of novelty. The “I’s” response
does not just solely depend on the attitudes to which it responds because if it did, everyone
would respond in the same way, as everyone in each particular social environment is
experiencing the same set of attitudes. There must, then, be something about each individual
that allows for the “I’s” response, in some cases, to be novel to them and to the space.
Therefore, the way in which each individual responds also depends on their unique
perspective. All of this together allows for an impression of a core sense self.
Perspective allows for individuals to consider their typical social environments and
derive meaning from them. This idea of the core sense of self must be, for example, the way
that I think about who I am, in relation to my particular social environments. In considering
this model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity, we can understand that different identities
circulate around this impression of a sense of self, and at different points, or different social
environments, certain identities are more salient. Thus, there is a way that I think about who I
am, and there are particular identities that I identify with that mean more, or become more
salient, in particular contexts. The saliency is affected by the context and my meaningmaking filter. To understand this further, the context must be defined and the experiences and
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perspective that fuels a person’s meaning-making filter must be considered, too. For
example, as a black student a part of a predominantly white liberal arts institution, my
identity as a black person (taken identity) is more salient than, say, my religion. It is more
salient in this particular context because of the way in which my identity as black is imposed
by the environment that I am in and the assumptions that influence the principles that shape
the way I understand my context.
To synthesize the previous claims, identity affects the way that I think about who I
am in particular social environments. There is an impression of the self because of the typical
social environments that I stay in, which shape how I think about who I am. Furthermore,
because of the way that identity is imposed and is context dependent, we are often confronted
with the expectations and ideas that come along with the imposition. This is why it is
important to recognize how identity is understood through a hermeneutical lens. These
expectations and the way that we respond to these expectations are one of the aspects that
fuel the dialectic between the “I” and “me.”
What I have tried to illustrate through explaining identity and how it relates to the self
is that in order to best understand the way that identity affects the self is to define the context
in which the individual is. In the next chapter, I will define a specific context where the “I”
and “me,” or the attitudes and responses, are in conflict because of oppression.
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Chapter Four: The Oppression of Queerness in Black Christian
Spaces
As noted in the introduction, what inspires this independent study is an attempt to
understand how oppression affects the self. This chapter’s purpose is to explicate the more
specific position at hand that states: there is a conflicting imposition (by being oppressed)
placed on queer folk in black Christian spaces that affects the self. This chapter is especially
important because it serves as a means to concretely understand the way that oppression can
affect the self by providing and defining a context in which an intelligible identity is
oppressed. This is supported by Frye when she notes that oppression, as a system, “could not
exist were not the groups, the categories of persons, well defined.”1 Thus, the previous
chapters serve has a theoretical basis for what is to be said here.
The structure of this chapter, then, is to first summarize and draw the theory of the
self, identity, and oppression together in order to understand how these three aspects help
elucidate the experience of an identity dissonance. This is important to reiterate as we come
to understand our selves with respect to the identities that are imposed, taken, or both (i.e.
how identity interacts with the impression of a core sense of self). As such, it will be
explained that the self, when oppressed, experiences, necessarily, a dialectical dissonance,
and may also experience an identity dissonance which differentiates the experience of
oppression from other kinds of stressors that may create a dissonance.
To best understand how oppression affects the self, it is important to understand the
context in which one is oppressed, as identities are context dependent. One context I think
that oppression is clear is in the context of queer folk within black Christian spaces. In
chapter two, we covered the complexity of social groups and how because of
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intersectionality, grouping can be further complicated. In this chapter, I will attempt to
present the culture and norms that often surround a particular culture group – that of
American black Christian spaces (henceforth black Christian spaces). Often, and
predominantly, within this space, queerness is synonymous with deviancy. Queer people in
black Christian spaces are molded, confined, and immobilized by interrelated systems that
make up their grouping that result in subordination. Queer people, in these contexts, are
shunned, scorned, barred from seats of power and authority, and, in some cases, subject to
violence. Thus, queer folk in black Christian spaces are oppressed. More specifically, here I
will assert that, often, within black Christian spaces there are cultural norms imposed based
on what it means to be a black Christian. Given these impositions, when you have an
intersectionality of identities (black, Christian, and queer), the queer identity, as an umbrella
term for those who identify on the LGBTQ+ spectrum and often an identity taken, poses a
threat to the norm of what is imposed by black Christian social groups. As queerness is
synonymous with deviancy in this space, queer folk in black Christian spaces are oppressed.
This is evident given what the experience of oppression entails.
Accordingly, I will support this assertion, that is, the position of this independent
study, by utilizing supporting literature and theory of black Christian culture and spaces.
Though it seems, to some, that stating oppression affects the self is obvious, what makes this
a philosophical exploration is the attempt to understand not only how oppression affects the
self, but to also show a situation where the individual notices and questions the dissonance
that occurs as a result of oppression affecting the self. Given this situation, the individual, in
response, has the opportunity to question the dissonances that occur. This exploration is in
nature metaphysical as it attempts to understand the nature of the self when oppressed.
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Section I: Identity Dissonance and How Oppression Affects the Self
The purpose of the first chapter is to not only provide a charitable reading to Mead’s
theory of the self, but to also provide argumentation that supports the claim and position that
oppression affects the self. Though the argument and support for this can be seen in chapter
one, it is fundamental to the overall project as it provides the first step in understanding how
oppression affects the self by first proving that oppression can affect the self, given the
nature of the self. It is evident that the phases can be in conflict through Mead noting that
there are certain situations where an individual can feel themself “hedged in” and within
those situations they may recognize “the necessity of a situation in which there will be an
opportunity for [them] to make [their] addition to the undertaking, and not simply to be the
conventionalized ‘me.’”2 By noting an experience of feeling “hedged in” this expression is
consistent with the experience of oppression as noted by Frye. The feeling of being “hedged
in,” though, is a necessary condition of the self being affected by social phenomenona, but
not the only effect occurring when one is oppressed by the dominant group. There seems to
be something missing that is addressed through understanding identity and the role identity
plays in understanding yourself and the social group of which one is a part.
Intelligible identities, like race, gender, and sexuality, as presented by Warnke and
Gooding-Williams, are context dependent and can be imposed or taken. Those identities
imposed are often a result of expectations based on societal norms and stereotypes and serve
as a means to situate that person within that particular context. Given the way social groups
and identities interrelate, there are potentially as many social groups as there are identities.
As a result, social groups are complex, and individuals can be members of groups that
oppose each other. What’s more, individuals can be a part of an oppressing group and an
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oppressed group. Although we as individuals may be a part of multiple and opposing identity
groups, identity helps us understand who we are by categorizing the different spaces we
occupy. By continuing to circulate between those particular spaces, we develop an
impression of a core sense of self – that is, an idea about who where are, beliefs we hold, and
character traits we exhibit. Given contrary or contradictory aspects of one's multiplicitious
and intersectional identity, there are some spaces where queer black Christians will
experience dissonance.
Identity dissonance is possible because identity is a way that we understand ourselves
through the impression of a core sense of self. There is a related concept called “identity
clarity,” which can be related to the saliency that is noted through the Model of Multiple
Dimensions of Identity. Identity clarity is defined “as the extent to which one’s self beliefs
are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable.”3 It lends to how well,
in terms of consistency, clarity, and stability, one has an impression of their core sense of
self. Identity clarity is related to self-esteem and psychological functioning. Identity clarity,
then, is a key capacity because dependent on the clarity, individuals may “better understand
which group memberships, or other cultural identities, relate to [their] personal identity and
to [their] well-being.”4 Identity clarity and the corresponding “self-conceptualizations are
acquired and developed through individuals’ interactions with others and are considerably
influenced by individuals’ cultural socialization, family socialization, [and] acculturation.”5
What may provide identity clarity comes from the different ways in which we have been
socialized through our different cultural or familial involvements. Thus, “the traits,

3Shadee Abdi and Bobbi Van Gilder. 2016. “Cultural (in)Visibility and Identity Dissonance: Queer IranianAmerican Women and Their Negotiation of Existence.” Journal of International & Intercultural
Communication. Vol. 9, no. 1. 71
4 Abdi. “Cultural (in)Visibility and Identity Dissonance.” 71
5 Abdi. “Cultural (in)Visibility and Identity Dissonance.” 71
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ideological positions, shared behaviors, experiences, and shared history that is associated
with one’s group(s) become internalized by the individual to compose an integral component
of an individual’s self-concept.”6
The ways in which we identify, are identified, or take a particular identity may be
dependent on or affected by the shared traits from our social groups that we internalize; these
characterizations that we have internalized often come from the shared norms that make up
that social group. In other words, collective or group identity can be internalized and aid in
self-conception: “individuals typically view themselves in terms of their group membership
categories, such that one’s group membership(s) become a key component of their individual
identity.”7 This is not only consistent with Gooding-Williams and the way that identity can
be taken and/or imposed, but also the understanding of social groups. It seems to be more
likely, then, for an identity dissonance to occur if an individual has identities from the
dominant, oppressive group and the group that was othered, or in other words, a member of
both the oppressive and the oppressed groups. This rings true as “identity dissonance suggest
that selves are composed of needs and desires that are often in opposition to each other,” this
opposition coming from being a part of opposing groups.
With the role that identity plays in the way that we understand ourselves and our
position within our social groups, it seems evident that intersectionality could complicate
these things – especially when one is a part of the oppressed group and the oppressive group.
Intersectionality serves as recognition of the particular experiences that folks experience
when they maintain a multiplicity of identities. From this multiplicity, there are several
factors that fuel our understanding of ourselves that can be contradictory given what the
norms are of the social groups that affect our identity clarity. Identity dissonance, then, is:
6
7
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“an unsettling feeling of psychological disquiet, occurring when people make a
commitment to two or more conflicting identities. Identity dissonance occurs
when an individual regards particular identities as essential components of his
or her self-concept yet also considered, consciously or unconsciously, these
identities to be antithetical.”8
With this definition, then, the idea presented can be unpacked and placed within the context
of this project.
Identity dissonance may occur with any identity that is intelligible – a means of
understanding ourselves and others. Given the relationship that we have with our identities
and how they relate with the social group we are a part of, the norms or expectations of each
identity or group identity can be in conflict. When Crymble notes that an identity dissonance
can occur as individuals make a commitment to two or more conflicting identities, this seems
to connect to the way that individuals can take an identity, committing to it by what they do
in light of identifying in that way. But it is also important to note that a commitment does not
have to be made to the way that an identity is imposed on an individual. Rather, the way that
an identity is imposed and taken may be different because of the way that stereotypes and
expectations fuel impositions. Thus, by merely being in a social environment where the
impositions, and consequently, expectations, placed on an individual are oppressive, the
individual is both a part of the group that is doing the oppressing and a part of the group that
is oppressed.
As intelligible identities are ways that we can understand ourselves, committing to
two or more identities that may have conflicting norms or expectations can negatively affect
our identity clarity or the impression of our core sense of self. The impression of our core
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sense of self gives light to “essential” components of our self-concept.9 Meaning, there are
the things we deem as personal attributes or characteristics – the impression we have about
who we are given the social groups in which we stay. This, then, results in a psychological
disquiet or a dialectical dissonance between the “I” and “me,” as the attitudes of the social
environment and the responses to those attitudes are in conflict. This is not to say that the “I”
and “me” are psychological functions, rather to note that an identity dissonance, as a result of
a commitment to conflicting identities, may create turmoil with the way that one experiences
and exists.
In having an identity dissonance, not only do we deem that the identities in conflict
are antithetical, thus in opposition, but we do so given the norms and expectations of what it
is to be each specific identity in conflict. This further supports the claim that identity
dissonance is especially possible if you are a part of the oppressed group and the dominant,
oppressive group. It is not unreasonable or ungrounded to have an identity dissonance, rather
the deviation from an imposition results in ostracization and othering. To avoid othering, this
leads one to find their identities to be antithetical, only committing to one or the other in each
space. Therefore, “what this means is that self, and usually society, presume that identities
are an ‘either—or’ proposition.”10 Hence, the experience of an identity dissonance indicates
that the individual has reached the conclusion that these identities, or parts of these identities,
should not simultaneously coexist. They are experienced hierarchically rather than
simultaneously, or as a newfangled amalgam.

This idea of essentiality is addressed in chapter 3. We ought not fall fault here to essentializing the self. There
is only an impression of a self-concept or a core sense of self given the similar social environments that we stick
to, which result in us attributing “essential” (as in significant, fundamental, or important to), personal
characteristics to the way that we perceive ourselves.
10 Crymble. “Contradiction Sells.” 65
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It is important to note that not every experience of identity dissonance will be because
of oppression – but oppression can cause an identity dissonance when you are a part of the
oppressive group and the oppressed group. As a member of the dominant group, one may
internalize oppressive norms (imposed) about what it is to be or have a particular identity.
But because individuals maintain a multitude of identities, as identities are intersectional,
individuals are not just one thing, individuals are multifaceted. Thus, in having identities that
may be conflicting because of the norms of the social group, as a result, one is “us” and
“them,” but in being a part of the dominant group, they have internalized the subordination.
So, within that individual’s self-concept or core sense of self, they deem the two identities
that are conflicting to be antithetical. To be oppressed is to be caught between or among
forces and barriers that restrict in order to subordinate. Therefore, the individual and their
social groups presume their identities to be an “either-or” proposition rather than a “this and
that” proposition because their self-expression is restricted. Identity is, again, experienced
here hierarchically rather than simultaneously.
Accordingly, the nature of the self while oppressed is experiencing a dialectical
dissonance, necessarily, as a result of the “stress” of the situation – the “I” will not be
conventionalized by the expectation of the “me” or the attitudes of the social environment
that the individual is in. For the individual who is experiencing an identity dissonance, there
is an expectation of one group identity, that in having another conflicting identity, the
understanding of their core sense of self is obscured. Because of this obfuscation, there is an
identity dissonance, a conflict with the way one understands themself, and a dialectical
dissonance, a conflict between the phases of the self. These dissonances differ in that the
identity dissonance is about the way in which an individual understands who they are, while
a dialectical dissonance describes the dissonance occurring between the two phases that make
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up the structure of an individuals’ very experience. The former is about the way one
understands themself, while the latter is about the ontology of the self.
As previously noted, a dialectical dissonance is a necessary condition, while an
identity dissonance is an accompanying condition that furthers understanding the nature of
the self while oppressed. What I mean by this is that the self, while oppressed, will
necessarily experience a dissonance between the “I” and the “me” because there is a conflict
between the attitudes of the social environment and not wanting to take on those oppressive
attitudes. An identity dissonance is an additional condition that may occur while the self is
oppressed. This is evident given that not only is there a dialectical dissonance occurring
between the “I” and “me,” but the way in which one understands who they are in their typical
social environments is obscured. Ultimately, there is not just something ontologically
occurring between the phases of the self, oppression may also affect the way that we
understand who we are.
This section served to not only explicate what it is to experience an identity
dissonance but to also show how it relates to claims made in previous chapters. By situating
this experience within Mead’s theory of the self and the understanding of identity, one can
better understand the nature of the self while oppressed. As oppression can manifest in
different ways, pinpointing the experience of an identity dissonance allows for a clearer
understanding of those who may be a part of an oppressed group and an oppressive group.
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Section II: My Identity Dissonance as Black and Queer
In this section, I hope to present a particular context of a social group by putting forth
the culture and norms, and thus attitudes, of the social group. By putting forth this context, I
provide my particular experience in order to understand a particular claim. That claim being:
there is a conflicting imposition (by being oppressed) placed on queer folk in black
(American) Christian spaces that affects the self. Though I am stating the norms of this
particular context, this is not to say every group of the same makeup functions in this way,
rather this is the story that is often told through literature and analysis, and the norms I have
personally experienced and have been affected by. This is the context of queerness in black
Christian spaces in America.
Being black is a result of a categorization. This idea comes from Gooding-Williams:
“being black is understood as a consequence of a practice of racial categorization to which
blacks have been subjected. Being black is thus socially constructed and imposed.”11 This
category of persons, then, was grouped by the dominant group (whites) in order to be othered
and oppressed. From grouping this racial category, the social group subsequently was made
up of norms that result in a picture, an idea, about what it is to be black. There are resulting
norms of the group that influence personal and group identity. As a result of this
internalization, if you do not fall in line, then you are not “black enough.” What is ironic
about this is that the norms and script did not exist before there was a grouping, thus the
picture about what it is to be “black enough” did not even originate from black folks. Thus,
there are norms that are imposed on one as a result of being a part of the black social group,
and if you do not do it right, then you are taunted or expelled from the group – you are
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deviant. These norms, the “script,” and group identity are perpetuated by the black church,
given its positionality and influence in black culture.
There have been continuous efforts made in order to understand the context of black
churches in America. This is most likely because “the black church in the USA is widely
recognized as the central, oldest and most influential institution in the black community.”12
Black churches are so influential because they serve as “the spiritual ark that also preserved
and empowered black people socially, psychologically and physically during and after
slavery.”13 Ward also notes: “even if as adults they no longer embrace the church or religious
principles, many blacks have been profoundly influenced by the church ideology and
imagery with which they were raised, and this continues to influence their later beliefs and
practices.”14 Thus, the culture, norms, and practices that black folk often internalize and
display are influenced by the black church.
Given the positionality of black churches for black folk in America, the norms and
ideals of the social group have to be explicated. Within this context, that is, black Christian
communities, “the church plays a significant role in the production of homophobia.”15 Ward
also notes that “what is also striking is the influence it wields indirectly in the lives of those
blacks that are not churchgoers.”16 So even those who do not go to church or those who are
not Christian are influenced by the black church. What lends clarity to this context and where
this production comes from, is a consideration of black nationalism, as the “theologicallydriven homophobia is reinforced by the anti-homosexual rhetoric of black nationalism.”17

12 Elijah G. Ward. 2005. "Homophobia, Hypermasculinity and the US Black Church." Culture, Health &
Sexuality. Vol 7, no. 5. 494
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The positionality surrounding the black Christian church and black nationalism are
interrelated. In her analysis of black nationalism, Professor of black studies Dr. Nikol
Alexander-Floyd describes nationalism as black cultural nationalism, where “cultural
nationalism is understood as ‘the view that African-Americans possess a distinct aesthetic,
sense of values, and communal ethos emerging from either, or both, their contemporary
folkways and continental African heritage.’”18 These norms and values are categorized as the
Black Cultural Pathology Paradigm, or BCPP.19 As a cultural pathology paradigm, BCPP
seems to be a description of the causes and effects of black cultural nationalism by
considering the aesthetic, sense of values, and ethos of the “Black Culture.” I add the
quotations around these words as “Black Culture” here is deemed as a specific thing in which
those who are grouped in the black social group are expected to partake.
The BCPP, or “this popular set of assumptions about Black family breakdown and
cultural deviance … has had devastating impact on Black communities.”20 As the BCPP
maintains a hegemonic and sexist ideology, it has negatively impacted black communities.
As a result, Alexander-Floyd utilizes BCPP as a framing device to assess black politics.21 In
order to do so, she points out several ironies about BCPP. The first irony is:
BCPP is a gendered framework of analysis that assumes that the dissolution of
the microstructure of the Black family (i.e., the decline of two parent homes
and an accompanying distortion in definitions and operations of manhood and
womanhood) produces a culture mired in a “tangle of pathology,” a way of life
that promotes drug use, crime, violence, apathy, and even poverty itself.22

18 Nikol G. Alexander-Floyd. 2007. Gender, Race and Nationalism in Contemporary Black Politics.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 3-4
19 Alexander-Floyd. Gender, Race, and Nationalism. 3
20 Alexander-Floyd. Gender, Race, and Nationalism. 3
21 Alexander-Floyd. Gender. Race, and Nationalism. 18
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The BCPP is a gendered analysis because it puts forth roles that men and woman ought to
fulfill but as a consequence of its fulfillment, the black family is expected to fail. These roles
of manhood and womanhood promote ‘drug use, crime, violence, apathy, and poverty.’ What
is ironic about this aspect of BCPP is that not only is it “propagated by conservatives,” but it
also “denies the historical and contemporary effects of racism and explains poverty and black
social crises as a function of Black cultural ineptitude.”23 As Gooding-Williams notes that to
be black is a result of a racial categorization, black folks were grouped as a result of being
deemed as other. BCPP was imposed on this “social group” which consequentially denies the
historical and contemporary effects of racism as the cause of black positionality in our
society; rather, the pathology of the positionality of black folks is ineptitude.
The next irony of the BCPP is that it “was made popular not only by White
conservatives, but by various constituencies within Black America as well.”24 This goes hand
in hand with the previous irony that Alexander-Floyd presents, as the BCPP is a result of the
dominant group (whites) grouping black folk. It is ironic because white folk benefit from it.
As there are some black constituencies that support the BCPP, “the BCPP is important in the
articulation and development of White U.S. nationalism as well as Black cultural
nationalism.”25 This point is twofold:
On the one hand, it constituted a political and cultural White nationalism for the
United States, reinscribing the boundaries of the nation through its figurative
(and increasingly literal) exclusion of Blacks. On the other hand, it enabled and
reinforced Black cultural nationalism amongst African-Americans, providing a
basis for arguing for the institution of patriarchy in African American
communities.26
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Black cultural nationalists have internalized these impositions, resulting in the fundamental
aspect of what it is to be black to include hegemonic ideologies, like the placement and roles
of men and woman and their relationship and positionality to their white counterparts.
Unfortunately, the culture surrounding the black church and the BCPP are interconnected,
and their ideologies are interchanging. So not only are these ideologies and norms being
perpetuated in the name of black nationalism, and thus, black power, but also in the church
that serves a fundamental influence on the lives of black folk in America today. The church
then perpetuates these ideals of heterosexism and homophobia that, as a result, shape what it
means to be black.27
Ward states and supports how homophobia and hypermasculinity are perpetuated by
the black church. First, he presents three sources of homophobia in the black church, all of
which are “intimately related to the history of black slavery, underscoring the complex
background influence of racism in the genesis of homophobia.” 28 The first is religious
beliefs, “related to literalist theological views.”29 Meaning, often homophobia is founded
within the scripture read and used in the church. It is noted that “black people’s use of the
Bible to condemn homosexuality is understandable in the context of their historical
experience, as enslaved blacks sought refuge, and found freedom in the literalness of
Scripture.”30 The second source “holds that, among blacks, homophobia may well be at least
in part the expression of a more general fear of sexuality … and homosexuality in particular,
[as] a psycho-cultural response to the history of white exploitation of black sexuality during
slavery and afterwards.”31 As a result of the hypersexualization that was ever present during

Heterosexism is the discrimination or prejudice against homosexuals on the assumption that heterosexuality is
the normal sexual orientation.
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29 Ward. “Homophobia.” 494
30 Ward. “Homophobia.” 495
31 Ward. “Homophobia.” 495
27
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chattel slavery, sexual acts that deviate from modest sexuality presented in the Bible are
reproved and othered. Essentially, “in response to debilitating stereotypes, black people in
the USA have been profoundly affected by the persistent efforts of whites to demonize them
and their sexuality,” straight or otherwise.32 The third source of homophobia within the black
church has to do with “notions of race survival consciousness,” meaning, the “homophobic
religious moralisms have dovetailed with the urgency of a racial consciousness of survival
and preservation among blacks.”33 Homosexuality, fundamentally, poses a threat to survival
and preservation. Thus, Bible interpretation, fear of sexuality, and race survival
consciousness serve as three sources of homophobia within the black church.
With these three sources in concurrence, it is noted that “whiteness and
homosexuality are both understood to connote weakness and femininity; conversely, black
masculinity has been constructed in hypermasculine terms.”34 Hypermasculinity is defined
as “an exaggeration and distortion of traditionally masculine traits.”35 As weakness and
femininity is associated with whiteness, in order to be “black enough” one must be hyper
masculine (those who identify as male). Thus, this internalization of BCPP and religiondriven homophobia not only negatively affect black folk who identify as homosexual, but
those who also blur the lines of their assigned (imposed) gender roles (that is, the prescribed
manhood and womanhood). The restriction of gender expression and sexuality are a result of
the relationship between the black church and the BCPP, both of which influence each other.
Thus, “normative conceptions of masculinity in US society are inherently heterosexist and
homophobic … Because of the conflation of gender and sexuality, to be seen as masculine
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34 Ward. “Homophobia.” 495
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requires being heterosexual, prompting the hypermasculinization of behavior among males in
order to avoid being labelled a ‘fag’ or ‘queer.’”36 In this quote, “queer” is used as a slur in
order to subordinate and oppress those who deviate from the norms put forth by the church
and the BCPP. Queerness is not just about being gay or one’s sexuality, though. When it is
taken, it is about existing outside of the norms of gender, gender roles, gender expression,
and sexuality. Hence, those who are gendered as male and who are not masculine enough are
chastised, those who are gendered as female who are too masculine are also chastised, and
those who refuse to abide by the binary are further ostracized for their deviancy.
Based on the norms of this particular context, what it means to be black is in tension
with the queer identity. Queerness is categorized as deviant as a result of homophobia and the
BCPP. The practice of homophobia and the internalization of the BCPP is a result of
impositions from groupings. The impositions of norms on black folk by black folk extends
beyond a racial categorization. It is rooted in internalized hegemony (evident through the
BCPP). Within the black social group, to “really” be black – one must fall in line with the
dominant culture that makes up the fabric of the social group, that is the aesthetic, sense of
values, and ethos of the “Black Culture.” In order for it to be convincing, your “me” must
convey those attitudes back to the others of that particular social group. Given that the black
social group was created in relationship to the white social group in order to be oppressed,
what has occurred as a result is an internalization of those hegemonic norms of the
oppressive group. Thus, deviancy from those norms is subordinated and othered, resulting in
oppression, even to those who are a part of the oppressing group. Those who are both black
and queer, members of the oppressive group and the oppressed group, still exist as black and
queer despite the imposed contradictions. The dominant members of the black social group,
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that is those who fall in line with what it means to “black enough,” subsequently oppress
those who are queer, and thus deviant.
What I experienced as a black Christian who is also transgender and queer was an
identity dissonance. Given the norms of what it is to be black, I felt like when I was in my
church, I had to hide my queerness that was evident though my gender expression and
sexuality. Queerness was oppressed by first being stigmatized, and by then being restricted
and subordinated. For the majority of my life, my identities were antithetical and thus
experienced hierarchically: black Christian first, queer second and in secret. As a member of
the black Christian church, I was a member of a group that oppressed queerness. So, in order
to not be oppressed by my family and my “brothers” and “sisters” of the church, my “me”
needed to conventionalize to those attitudes of the social group of which I was a part.
Experiencing this dissonance was a “motivating tension,” where this tension arose due to my
commitment to identities unchosen, that is, my blackness and my queerness. Both of these
identities could not be given up; yet, the former meant that in order to be taken seriously as
black (to be black enough), and to be accepted by the group I did not have a choice in being a
part of, I had to internalize those ideals about what it meant to be the assigned and imposed
gender that I denied and to be the assigned and imposed sexuality (heterosexuality) I also
denied.
This tension, then, led me to “remove one of the offending identities from [my] selfconcept; [to] continue to wrestle with the tension,” to find “alternative psychological and/or
behavioral strategies (e.g., distraction) in order to mitigate the resulting anxiety; or … [to]
adjust [my] conception of the identities in order to conceive them as corresponding.”37 For
me, my identity dissonance resulted in a distain for Christianity rather than for my blackness
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– Christianity was a choice, negotiable and able to be denied, my blackness was not. What I
did not know at the time was how much these identities in the dominant narrative were so
intertwined. Black churches hold a position within black culture. So even though I rebuked
my Christianity in the name of acceptance and love for myself, for my queerness, so many of
the norms and ideals of what I thought I needed to uphold in order to be “black enough”
originated from the church.
By being a part of one social group that created a collective, group identity – an
identity that I deemed to be fundamental to the way that I understand who I am – whose
norms supported the oppression and subordination of another identity I held, affected my
self. A dialectical dissonance and an identity dissonance are occurring as my self is affected
by oppression. The nature of the self is that it is comprised of two phases, the “I” and the
“me,” where these phases are in constant dialectic. The dominant black social group upholds
attitudes that members are expected to reflect back to that social group though their “me.”
Because of the conflicting identities that I uphold, my “I,” or response, is in conflict with the
“me,” or attitudes of the social group, resulting in a dialectical dissonance. As a member of a
social group, one feels obligated to “have those habits, those responses which everybody has;
otherwise the individual could not be a member of the community.”38 But, I could not reflect
those responses or habits as a member of the black social group while simultaneously being
queer. This resulted in an identity dissonance wherein I experienced my identities
hierarchically rather than simultaneously. This affected my self not only ontologically by
creating a dissonance, but it also distorted my identity clarity and my impression of my core
sense of self.
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Section III: An Opportunity for a Rectification of Dissonances
Being a part of a group that upholds oppressive norms toward those who do not
conform is an experience in which many are intentionally or unintentionally involved. What
complicates this further is if you are a part of this group and you do not conform, you are a
part of the oppressive group and the group that is oppressed. Given these dissonances that are
occurring as a result of this experience, your self is continually being negatively affected
through phase dissonance, and your self-conception or self-perception is distorted as a result.
The question, then, is what happens when this occurs? In other words, what is one supposed
to do in this kind of situation?
First and foremost, I do not think that everyone’s experience will be the same. My
intention in this Independent Study was to provide a theoretical and philosophical
explanation of my own experience and discern whether or not this affected my “self.” In the
process, I tried to understand the components of the question of how oppression affects the
self. Secondly, I do not wish, nor ought I, to instantiate some sort of obligation on those
oppressed to cure themselves of the dissonances they experience as a result of said
oppression, especially when they are not even the cause of their oppression nor is the
oppression justified.
Mead, though, broadly puts forth a potential response to a dialectical dissonance. This
suggestion, though, assumes that one is open and willing to act in opposition to the norms of
the social group of which one is a part. This is why I do not assert that there is an obligation
to act in opposition. Often, it is safer to reflect back the attitudes of the social environment of
which one is a part. There should not be a normative claim in play that asserts what one
should do without first considering what one can do.

75

Mead asserts that in acting in opposition to the attitudes of the social environment,
thus, uncensored, one is in a “situation of self-assertion where the self [can] simply [assert]
itself against others.”39 When the self is not in opposition but working with others,
the ‘me’ is determined by the situation. There are certain recognized fields
within which an individual can assert himself, certain rights which he has within
these limits. But let the stress become too great, these limits are not observed,
and an individual asserts himself in perhaps a violent fashion. Then the ‘I’ is
the dominant element against the ‘me.’40
It is clear that in some instances, a social situation could arise that could cause an individual
to assert themself in opposition to the “me,” or organized set of attitudes of the environment.
The previously explored situation in section II is one of them. I want to note here that an
individual does not have to assert themself violently. There are other instances that Mead
puts forth where “one can let himself go, in which the very structure of the ‘me’ opens the
door for the ‘I,’ [which is] favorable to self-expression.”41 In the aforementioned instance
specifically, it seems to be the case that stress, resulting in the dissonance, could cause one to
disregard the limits of social convention. Rather than acting in a way that is controlled or
censored by the social environment, the individual expresses themself by asserting its self
against others, through the “I” overtaking the “me.” We know now that oppression is more
complicated than just any kind of stress; there may be other factors in play because of
oppression but harmonizing the “I” and “me” could be an important step in rectifying the
effects of oppression.
Mead goes on to say that: “When an individual feels himself hedged in, he recognizes
the necessity of a situation in which there will be an opportunity for him to make his addition
Mead. Social Psychology. 238 (emphasis added)
Mead. Social Psychology. 238 (emphasis added)
41 Mead. Social Psychology. 241 – In this instance, it is not to say that in always acting uncensored by the
attitudes of the environment the “I” is expressed. Rather, this particular position seems to note an instance
where the “I” and “me” are in harmony.
39
40
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to the undertaking, and not simply to be the conventionalized ‘me.’”42 This language here of
feeling “hedged in” is congruent with Frye’s language of being caged in when oppressed.
Therefore, what Mead suggests could be a step in rectifying the experience of oppression.
When an individual is in certain situations, there is an opportunity, not an obligation, for the
individual to not merely act as “the conventionalized me” or stick to the attitudes of the
environment one is in. Although Mead does not explicitly say that oppression causes the
dissonance, he does assert that when a dissonance occurs, the “I” has an opportunity to
overtake the “me” by not submitting to the attitudes and then responding in a novel way. It is
reasonable to assume that oppression may lead to the dissonance between the “I” and “me,”
and as a result, one may ignore the conventions of the social environment which holds
oppressive ideologies and not conform.
As there is an intersectionality of identities, this process is not easy to perform.
People are multifaceted and continually experience an intersection of identities: I am never
just black in one space or queer in another, I am always a black queer person whether others
know or not. Given this difficultly, the unconventionalizing of the “me” first happens
internally in the mind: “a person asserting his rights on a certain occasion has rehearsed the
situation in his own mind; he has reacted toward the community and when the situation arises
he arouses himself and says something already in his mind.”43 Though it may be easier to
rehearse to oneself by reflecting on the experience internally, acting in reality may be more
complicated. Hence, one may experience their identities hierarchically and not
simultaneously in order to avoid intergroup conflict, wherein each respective social
environment they can reflect back to that social group the attitudes the group presents to
them. This may be intentional or unintentional, but on some level the individual knows that
42
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in experiencing an identity dissonance, they are not hiding or suppressing an identity; rather
in taking that identity, they know that the way they take it will be context dependent.
Furthermore, with any identity taken, they know that to take an identity is to make choices
and formulate plans in light of one’s identification in that way. This does not entail that in
taking an identity that it will always be known to others, but by taking an identity, the
choices that they make or the way that they live will be in light of identifying in that way. For
me, among others, this resulted in the activity of inviting others in rather than coming out.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this Independent Study was to understand how oppression affects the
self. More specifically, this question was to be understood in order to consider the experience
and the position that there is a conflicting imposition (by being oppressed) placed on queer
folk in black (American) Christian spaces that affects the self. To best answer the question of
how oppression affects the self, it first had to be understood what was being asked. Thus, in
the first chapter, a theory of the self was presented through a charitable reading of Mead. By
putting forth this theory, it was argued that based on this telling of the self, the self is able to
be affected by oppression. The latter part of the chapter served to further understand the
nature of the self while in dissonance, as a dissonance can be expected given its nature. The
next two chapters were utilized in order to better understand oppression and the role identity
plays in understanding who one is. Finally, the last chapter not only synthesized this
information in order to understand the question, but also explained what is occurring when
the self is oppressed. By presenting the particular context of black queer folk in Christian
spaces, I was able to provide a particular experience to further elucidate my particular claim.
Throughout reading, considering, analyzing, critiquing, and rereading this
Independent Study, I hope that I was able to make a few points clear, perhaps implicitly. First
and foremost, the self, as a frame of one’s experience, is the kind of thing that has the
potential to be constantly growing, evolving, and changing. This all may occur as we
continue to wrestle with the attitudes of the different social environments that we are in.
Essentially, social occurrences will inevitably affect not only the nature of the self but the
way that we think about who we are. But, despite these inevitable changes, each experience
and social group that we are a part of lend to our own impression of who we think we are or
our “core sense of self.” What’s more is that we will always be capable of novelty. Though
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we may stick to similar social environments, new experiences and environments bring about
new content that fuel one’s “I” and “me.” Novelty, and thus individuality, is possible and not
everyone’s “self” is conventionalized by the attitudes of their social environment.
Similarly, through my analysis, the question of “who am I?” becomes “how ought I
think about who I am?” They differ in that the question of “who am I?” requires one to
ascribe and/or pinpoint qualities that seem to describe who you are. The question of “how
ought I think about who I am?” takes in consideration not only the constant influx of
experiences that may continue to affect us and fuel the conversation between the “I” and
“me,” but also the way that we think about who we are. Thus, “how ought I think about who
I am?” means that who you are is not just a product of the social environments you are a part
of, it also includes the way in which we understand ourselves and how we choose to assert
ourselves in our different social groups.
Lastly, it is important to note that the self is equipped to deal with and overcome the
effects of oppression. Though the oppressed may resist oppression, the responsibility to
eradicate oppression does not lie on those oppressed, nor is it the responsibility of the
oppressed to heal themselves. But, throughout this process of understanding how oppression
affects the self, it is clear that the self has the ability to overcome dissonance. Although social
groups hold oppressive norms and oppress those who deviate, subordinating and
immobilizing them, oppression does not render the self incapable of response. We each have
the capacity to respond to oppression in the way that works best for us. We each, too, can
find spaces that support and uplift every aspect of who we are. We do not merely have to be
what is imposed.
This thesis worked to understand how oppression affects the self, but some things are
left unsaid or not answered completely, perhaps in a way that may leave the reader with
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questions. How does the oppressed exist? How do we stop oppression? What can the
oppressed do in the face of oppression? For those who may not relate to the experience of the
oppressed, those may have follow up questions as well. Perhaps, they may ask, how do I
understand the experience of the oppressed? How can I help those oppressed, or in other
words, stop oppressing? For all these questions, I would suggest more philosophical
readings: Franz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks where he further explores the black identity
and the black experience; Joseph Winters’ “Rac(e)ing From Death. Baldwin, Bataille, and
the Anguish of the (Racialized) Human,” which addresses the temporality and futurity of
black queer bodies; No Tea, No Shade: New Black Queer Studies, an anthology of essays on
black gender and sexuality; Lee McBride’s “Insurrectionist Ethics and Racism,” which
discusses the liberation of racially oppressed people; and forthcoming, Margy Adams’
“Insurrecting Purity: Creativity as Resistance in Somatic Ambiguity,” which addresses the
experience of the Other and provides a way to understand the experience of the Other
through creative fiction.
Though many philosophers argue for the intrinsic value of philosophy, it can be
instrumentally valuable, too. By this, I mean that philosophy can not only explore the nature
of something but can respond to it and engage with it. This kind of philosophy is often seen
as the theories that supports all other disciplines. I mention this though to say that the
purpose of this Independent Study is not to merely show how the self is affected by
oppression, but it ultimately is a response piece. A response to my own oppression. A way to
philosophically understand my own experience while oppressed by those who look just like
me.

81

Bibliography
Abdi, Shadee and Bobbi Van Gilder. 2016. “Cultural (in)Visibility and Identity Dissonance:
Queer Iranian-American Women and Their Negotiation of Existence.” Journal of
International & Intercultural Communication. Vol. 9, no. 1.
Abes, Elisa S., Susan R. Jones, and Marylu K. McEwen. 2007. “Reconceptualizing the
Model of Multiple Dimensions of Identity: The Role of Meaning-Making Capacity in
the Construction of Multiple Identities” Journal of College Student Development, vol.
48, no. 1. pp. 1-22.
Aboulafia, Mitchell. 2016. "George Herbert Mead", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Aboulafia, Mitchell. 2016. “George Herbert Mead and the Unity of the Self”, European
Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], VIII-1, URL:
http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/465
Adams, Marguerite. (2019 – Forthcoming –). “Insurrecting Purity: Creativity as Resistance in
Somatic Ambiguity.” Senior Independent Study Theses.
Alexander-Floyd, Nikol G. 2007. Gender, Race and Nationalism in Contemporary Black
Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Barthold, Lauren Swayne. 2016. A Hermeneutic Approach to Gender and other Social
Identities. 1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
Battle, Juan and Colin Ashley. 2008. “Intersectionality, Heteronormativity, and Black
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Families.” Black Women, Gender
& Families 2 (1). University of Illinois Press.
82

Budge, Stephanie L. and Bonnie Moradi. 2018. “Attending to Gender in Psychotherapy:
Understanding and Incorporating Systems of Power.” Journal of Clinical Psychology,
vol. 74, no. 11. pp. 2014-27.
Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment. Ed. 2nd. New York: Routledge.
Crymble, Sarah B. 2012. “Contradiction Sells: Feminine Complexity and Gender Identity
Dissonance in Magazine Advertising.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 36, no. 1.
Fanon, Frantz. 1967. Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press
Frye, Marilyn. 1983. “Oppression.” The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory.
Berkeley: Crossing Press.
Frye, Marilyn. 1983. “Sexism.” The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Berkeley:
Crossing Press.
Gooding-Williams, Robert. 2006. “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,” Look, A Negro!
Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture and Politics. New York: Routledge.
Griffin, Gabriele. 2017. "Sexuality." In A Dictionary of Gender Studies. Oxford University
Press.
Johnson, E. Patrick, ed. 2016. No Tea, No Shade: New Writings in Black Queer Studies.
Durham: Duke University Press.
McBride III, Lee A. 2017. “Insurrectionist Ethics and Racism,” The Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy and Race. Ed. Naomi Zack. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

83

McBride III, Lee A. 2018. “New Descriptions, New Possibilities.” Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 1. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University.
Mead, George Herbert. 1934. Mind, Self & Society. Chicago, Ill: The University of
Chicago press.
Mead, George Herbert. 1956. On Social Psychology, Ed. Anselm Straus.
Pfeffer, Carla A. 2016. Queering Families: The Postmodern Partnerships of Cisgender
Womenand Transgender Men. New York, NY: Oxford University Press
Singlmann, Peter.1972. "Exchange as Symbolic Interaction: Convergences between Two
Theoretical Perspectives." American Sociological Review. v. 37, no. 4.
Ward, Elijah G. 2005. "Homophobia, Hypermasculinity and the US Black Church." Culture,
Health & Sexuality. v.7, no. 5. 494
Warnke, Georgia. 2008. After Identity: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Gender. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central.
Wilchins, Riki Anne. 2004. Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer. 1st ed. Los
Angeles, California: Alyson Books.
Winters, Joseph. 2017. “Rac(e)ing From Death. Baldwin, Bataille, and the Anguish of the
(Racialized) Human.” Journal of Religious Ethics. v.45, no. 2. Wiley Online Library.
doi:10.1111/jore.12182.
Young, Iris Marion. 2014. “Five Faces of Diversity.” Diversity, Social justice, and Inclusive
Excellence: Transdisciplinary and Global Perspective. edited by Seth N. Asumah,
and Mechthild Nagel. Albany: State University of New York Press

84

